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I. INTRODUCTION
The final report of the American Bar Association Special
Committee on Evaluation of Disciplinary Enforcement in the
United States, issued in June 1970, stated:
After three years of studying lawyer discipline throughout
the country, this Committee must report the existence of a
scandalous situation that requires the immediate attention of
the profession. With few exceptions, the prevailing attitude of
lawyers toward disciplinary enforcement ranges from apathy to
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outright hostility. Disciplinary action is practically nonexistent
in many jurisdictions; practices and procedures are antiquated;
[and] many disciplinary agencies have little power to take ef-
fective steps against malefactors.'
This assessment by the Clark Committee, named for its Chair-
man, retired Supreme Court Justice Tom C. Clark, was a reason-
ably accurate statement of the situation in South Carolina at
that time. Through 1969 only sixteen lawyers had ever received
some form of public discipline and only eight lawyers had ever
been privately reprimanded.
Disciplinary enforcement in the United States has improved
dramatically since the publication of the Clark Committee Re-
port.2 Nowhere is this statement more true than in South Caro-
lina. The statistical record, shown in Table 1, speaks for itself.
From January 1970 through June 1984, forty-nine lawyers ad-
mitted to practice in South Carolina were disbarred, thirteen ir-
revocably resigned while under investigation for ethics viola-
tions, twenty-eight were indefinitely suspended, fifty received
public reprimands, and sixty received private reprimands.' The
largest number of disciplinary sanctions to date occurred in 1983
when nine lawyers were disbarred, three resigned while under
investigation for ethics violations, two were indefinitely sus-
pended, eight received public reprimands and eight received pri-
vate reprimands.
This Article describes and evaluates the disciplinary en-
forcement system in South Carolina. The Article concludes that:
(1) There is no evidence that South Carolina practitioners are
less ethical than lawyers in other states; (2) South Carolina's ex-
isting disciplinary system is one of the most efficient in the
country; (3) the South Carolina Supreme Court has consistently
1. ABA SPECIAL COMMITrEE ON EVALUATION OF DISCIPLINARY ENFORCEMENT,
PROBLEMS AND RECOMMENDATIONS IN DISCIPLINARY ENFORCEMENT 1 (Hon. Tom C. Clark,
Chairman 1970)[hereinafter cited as CLARK CoMMITTEE REPORT].
2. See, e.g., MePike & Harrison, The True Story on Lawyer Discipline, 70 A.B.A. J.
92 (1984); Steele & Nimmer, Lawyers, Clients, and Professional Regulation, 1976 AM. B.
FOUND. RESEARCH J. 919, 933-46.
3. From 1968-1980, the Board of Commissioners on Grievances and Discipline also
issued 86 letters of caution. This practice was discontinued after the South Carolina Su-
preme Court held that such letters were not authorized by the Rule on Disciplinary Pro-
cedure. See In re Davis, 276 S.C. 532, 280 S.E.2d 644 (1981); In re Belser, 277 S.C. 250,
287 S.E.2d 139 (1982).
19851
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TABLE 1. Disciplinary Sanctions Against South Carolina Lawyers
Indefinite Public Private
















1965 1 1 1
1966 1 1
1967 2 1 1




1971 3 2 2
1972 2 4 3 2 letters of
caution
1973 2 1 2
1974 1 3 1
1975 4 1 1 2 6
1976 2 2 6 2 4 15 letters of
caution
1977 4 1 5** 10 13 letters of
caution
1978 8 1 1 3 5 27 letters of
caution
1979 4 1 5 11 8 letters of
caution
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TABLE 1. Disciplinary Sanctions Against South Carolina Lawyers (continued)
Indefinite Public Private
Year Disbarment Resignation* Suspension Reprimand Reprimand* Other




1981 2 1 3 3
1982 6 1 3 7 2 I repay fee
1983 9 3 2 8 8 1 repay fee





TOTAL 55 13 33 54 68 95
*Only resignations involving lawyers who, at the time of acceptance of the resignation, were under
investigation for ethics violations are included. There have been a number of published opinions in-
volving resignations in recent years for nondisciplinary reasons, e.g., transfer of residence to another
state, and inability to meet the 12 hour per year mandatory continuing legal education requirement
imposed on all South Carolina practitioners by the South Carolina Supreme Court.
**The opinion imposing one of the public reprimands in 1977 was subsequently reversed by the
United States Supreme Court. See In re Smith, 436 U.S. 412 (1978), reversing 268 S.C. 259, 233
S.E.2d 301 (1977).
***Derived from the Annual Reports of the Board of Commissioners on Grievances and Discipline.
The Annual Reports are based on an October 1 through September 30 fiscal year. The public disci-
pline cases are based on a calendar year basis used in the official reports of the decisions.
****The period covered is through June 30, 1984. No private reprimands are reported for 1984 since
the 1984 Annual Report of the Board of Commissioners on Grievances and Discipline was not availa-
ble at the time this material was written.
imposed stiff disciplinary sanctions for what it regards as serious
ethical violations and has in recent years implemented several
procedural improvements in the way disciplinary cases are han-
dled; and (4) nevertheless, several changes designed to make the
system better understood and accepted by both the public and
lawyers are desirable.
5
Haynsworth: Disciplinary Actions by the South Carolina Supreme Court and the
Published by Scholar Commons,
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
II. DISCIPLINARY ENFORCEMENT IN SOUTH CAROLINA PRIOR TO
1970
A. Statehood Through 1957
The period prior to 1970 may be divided into two stages.
The first period extends from statehood until 1958. During this
lengthy period, the South Carolina Supreme Court disciplined
only six lawyers.4 The first disciplinary action occurred in 1821
when the supreme court disbarred a lawyer who had been con-
victed of subornation of perjury.5 The second action did not oc-
cur until eighty-seven years later, in 1908.6 The last opinion in
this era was issued in 1931. 7 From 1931 through 1957, the only
significant development in this area was the supreme court's
adoption in 1956 of the Canons of Ethics, which had been ap-
proved by the American Bar Association in 1908. South Carolina
was one of the last states to adopt the Canons of Ethics.
The year 1958 was chosen as the beginning of the second
stage because the supreme court promulgated its Rule on Disci-
plinary Procedure in that year, establishing the Board of Com-
missioners on Grievances and Discipline (Board).8 The rule gave
the Board the authority to investigate grievances made against
lawyers and to make recommendations for sanctions to the su-
preme court. Prior to the creation of the Board, grievance cases
were heard on original petitions filed in the circuit court or su-
preme court. Local bar associations 9 and the South Carolina Bar
4. Other lawyers may have been disciplined without a published opinion or may
have been allowed to resign. In a 1902 decision, the South Carolina Supreme Court
stated: "Proceedings in disbarment have been and still are of very rare occurrence in the
annals of South Carolina. One can tell perhaps on the fingers of one hand all the in-
stances of similar accusations on record in our courts." In re Duncan, 64 S.C. 461, 480, 42
S.E. 433, 440 (1902). At the time of this statement, there was only one published discipli-
nary opinion.
5. State v. Holding, 12 S.C.L. (1 McCord) 379 (1821).
6. In re Duncan, 81 S.C. 290, 62 S.E. 406 (1908).
7. State v. Jennings, 161 S.C. 263, 159 S.E. 627 (1931).
8. S.C. Sup. CT. R. Disc. P. §§ 1-42 (Supp. 1984). This Rule, effective September 1,
1958, has been amended several times: February 15, 1962, January 18, 1964, September
18, 1965, September 15, 1967, January 15, 1970, June 12, 1975, January 9, 1978, June 6,
1980, October 20, 1982, February 16, 1983, October 5, 1983, and October 16 and 17, 1984.
The January 1978 amendments were the most extensive.
9. See In re Duncan, 64 S.C. 461, 475-76, 42 S.E. 433, 438 (1902).
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Association Grievance Committee filed some of these cases. 10
The Attorney General, usually after receiving notification that a
lawyer had been convicted of a serious crime, filed others.1 Indi-
vidual lawyers filed three.
12
An examination of two of these pre-1958 cases reveals the
basic reasons why disciplinary sanctions were so rarely imposed
during this period. The first such case is the 1902 opinion, In re
Duncan." Duncan arose as an original disbarment petition filed
in the supreme court by a practitioner, D.W. Robinson of Co-
lumbia. Robinson based the petition on Duncan's misrepresenta-
tion of the status of title to certain real estate, improper use of
client security funds, and Duncan's contempt of court citation
for refusing to pay trust funds after being ordered to do so by a
circuit court judge. All of the allegations arose from a mortgage
transaction which involved one of Robinson's clients. The su-
preme court refused to impose any sanction although the re-
spondent in Duncan admitted the commingling charge. The
court pointed out that the respondent stated that he was at all
times ready and able to repay the money in question, and had in
fact paid it to the court prior to the filing of the disciplinary
petition, and stated: "Such conduct in an attorney may be and is
reprehensible for its laxity, but it is not necessarily fraudulent
and it does not furnish ground for disbarment.'
4
The court's emphasis on a fraudulent motive as the basis of
serious disciplinary actions permeates the opinion. Describing
disbarment proceedings generally, the court stated:
When a court is asked to exercise its summary jurisdiction over
10. See State v. Jennings, 161 S.C. 263, 159 S.E. 627 (1931).
11. See In re Duncan, 64 S.C. at 476, 42 S.E. at 438. See also In re Evans, 94 S.C.
414, 78 S.E. 227 (1913) (Attorney General filed disciplinary proceedings against alcoholic
lawyer).
12. See In re Duncan, 64 S.C. 461, 42 S.E. 433 (1902); Ex parte Gadsden, 89 S.C.
352, 71 S.E. 952 (1911); In re Sims, 97 S.C. 37, 81 S.E. 279 (1913). Gadsden, which
resulted in the first public reprimand issued by the South Carolina Supreme Court, was
unusual because the lawyer in question had filed a petition in the supreme court asking
the court to "clear his name" in connection with a civil case in which an estate settle-
ment had been set aside based on the lawyer's improper conduct. The case had been
settled over the lawyer's objections after an appeal had been filed. Instead of clearing the
lawyer's name, the supreme court considered disbarring him. The court finally decided
that a public reprimand was sufficient under the circumstances.
13. 64 S.C. 461, 42 S.E. 433 (1902).
14. Id. at 483, 42 S.E. at 441.
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an attorney to the extent of expelling him from the profession,
as in the case before us, it is proper to consider what the courts
have the right to require of a lawyer. All the books and author-
ities that treat of this subject agree that the three main requi-
sites are learning, diligence, integrity, but that the greatest of
these is integrity. Ignorance of law and neglect of business may
keep a lawyer in the lowest ranks of his profession, and render
him liable in damages to his clients for any loss caused thereby,
but such should afford no ground for disbarment. But the man
who is lacking in integrity, and who does not deal honestly and
fairly with his client, the court, and the other party, but who
practices deceit or fraud or dishonesty or overreaching craft, no
matter how learned and diligent he may be, is unworthy of his
profession, and should be disbarred. It has therefore been held
that the court may strike the name of an attorney from the
rolls for fraudulent conduct, although it may not be so gross as
to be criminally punishable. Gross misconduct is always good
and sufficient ground for disbarment. But the case must be
clear against the attorney, not only as to the act charged, but
that it was committed with a bad or fraudulent motive.15
Another interesting aspect of Duncan is the supreme court's
discussion of the procedural aspects of the case. The court
pointed out that Duncan was the first disciplinary case filed by a
lawyer against another lawyer in the supreme court. The court
further commented that:
It has been customary in cases such as this to call a meeting of
the members of the bar to which the respondent belongs, and
in a proper case, after due and thorough deliberation on the
accusations brought against him, to select one or more breth-
ren of this bar to institute proceedings for disbarment. By this
usual method, charges against a respondent are more thor-
oughly sifted. The serious step of moving to disbar is only
taken when a majority of the respondent's brethren of the bar
are satisfied that his name should be stricken from the roll of
attorneys, and the proceeding is happily relieved of all suspi-
cion of personal or private animosity and prejudice. We do not
wish to be understood to condemn the course pursued by Mr.
Robinson in this case, nor to question the purity of his motives.
We simply wish to indicate the more commendable method.
We know of no previous deviations, except when an attorney
15. Id. at 482, 42 S.E. at 440.
[Vol. 36
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general or a circuit solicitor moved for the disbarment of an
attorney who had been convicted of a felony or an infamous
offense, submitting the record as the ground of the motion.16
Duncan was subsequently disbarred in 1908 for submitting
a false affidavit in connection with a motion for a new trial in a
criminal case,17 and he was subsequently convicted of contempt
of court in 1909 for continuing to practice law after being dis-
barred.'" Accordingly, the disbarment finally vindicated the bold
action Robinson had taken in 1902.
The South Carolina Supreme Court has clearly repudiated
the quoted language in Duncan and does not hesitate to impose
disciplinary sanctions in trust fund and serious neglect cases ir-
respective of the respondent's intent. In fact, trust fund and
neglect cases constitute two of the largest categories of cases in
which the court has imposed sanctions against South Carolina
lawyers.' 9
A second instructive case from the pre-1958 era is State v.
Jennings,20 decided in 1931. The respondent in Jennings main-
tained a thriving law practice, was the mayor of Sumter for four-
teen years, was chairman of the roads commission for a number
of years, and was a successful businessman and bank president.
Charges of ethical improprieties were filed against the respon-
dent before the Sumter County Bar Association in 1924. The
charges involved improper investment of clients' funds without
their consent and without proper disclosure of the nature of the
investments, improper satisfactions of liens held by clients with-
out their consent, and improper commingling of the attorney's
funds with client trust funds. Included was a charge that the
lawyer used $30,000 belonging to the estate of a minor whom he
represented in personal business ventures that failed.
The Sumter County Bar Association investigated the
charges but took no action when the respondent assured the bar
association that he would alter his conduct. Two years later, the
same charges were presented to the South Carolina Bar Griev-
ance Committee. The committee took four years to complete its
16. Id. at 476, 42 S.E. at 438.
17. In re Duncan, 81 S.C. 290, 62 S.E. 406 (1908).
18. In re Duncan, 83 S.C. 186, 65 S.E. 210 (1909).
19. See Table 3.
20. 161 S.C. 263, 159 S.E. 627 (1931).
1985] 317
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investigation, and in 1930 recommended the filing of disciplinary
proceedings in the supreme court. The court found that except
for the use of funds from the minor's estate, the charges did not
show "bad or fraudulent motives, depravity of character, or dis-
honesty or want of integrity, which would warrant his suspen-
sion or disbarment on these charges alone."'" The court further
held, however, that misappropriation of the minor's funds was
more serious and, combined with the other charges, justified a
sanction. The court disbarred the respondent, but the disbar-
ment order was suspended on condition that the respondent re-
pay the $30,000 in question at the rate of $100 per month.2 The
repayment period was therefore twenty-five years.
In the course of the Jennings opinion, the court stated:
[A]cts charged against an attorney to warrant his disbarment
or suspension must be of such a character as to show that their
commission was with a bad or fraudulent motive and they
must be supported by a clear preponderance of the evidence.
The conduct must be so gross as to show a want of integrity,
moral turpitude, depravity of character, or dishonesty. There
should be "a clear conviction of moral fraud.
23
Given the supreme court's insistence on proof of moral de-
pravity, its reliance on petitions from the South Carolina Bar
Association and local bar associations, and its discouragement of
original proceedings by individual lawyers, it is not surprising
that very few disciplinary cases were filed in the pre-1958
period.
B. 1958 Through 1969
During the period extending from 1958 to the time that the
Board of Commissioners on Grievances and Discipline was es-
tablished at the end of 1969, the number of disciplinary cases
brought before the Board and the number of sanctions imposed
against lawyers gradually but significantly increased.24 Although
21. Id. at 268, 159 S.E. at 629.
22. The respondent was also required to obtain and finance a $15,000 life insurance
policy in favor of the minor, who had by that time reached adulthood. Id. at 274, 159
S.E. at 631.
23. Id. at 266, 159 S.E. at 628.
24. See Table 2.
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the Board handled only four cases in 1958 and eight in 1959, the
number of cases the Board handled increased to sixty in 1968
and sixty-four in 1969.25 The Board also issued eight private
reprimands during this period. From 1958 through the end of
1969, the South Carolina Supreme Court also issued nine disci-
plinary opinions, imposing public sanctions on ten lawyers. 26
These opinions established several basic principles. The most
important principle is that the Board merely makes advisory
recommendations to the supreme court, which is not bound by
the Board's findings of fact or recommended sanctions. As
stated in Burns v. Clayton,27 the first case from the Board to
reach the supreme court, the following "fundamentals" govern
disciplinary proceedings:
[T]hat this is not a criminal proceeding nor an appeal from the
judgment of a lower court; that the Board of Commissioners on
Grievances and Discipline are officers of this court, commis-
sioned and charged with the duty of investigating alleged mis-
conduct on the part of their fellow members of the bar of this
State and of reporting to this court the proceedings of their
inquiry, and their findings and recommendations; that the
Board's report is advisory only, this court being in nowise
bound to accept its findings of fact or to concur in its recom-
mendations; and upon this court alone rests the duty and the
grave responsibility of adjudging, from the record, whether or
not professional misconduct has been shown, and of taking ap-
propriate disciplinary action thereabout. 8
The second basic principle is that restitution or settlement
of a grievance with a client, or dismissal or acquittal of criminal
25. See id. The Board did not keep records on the yearly totals of grievance inquir-
ies it received until 1982. The Board only reported the number of cases placed on its
docket and investigated in the particular year. Grievance inquiries that were not dock-
eted because a formal written complaint was not filed, and inquiries dismissed by the
chairman because the facts alleged in the complaint were clearly not sufficient to consti-
tute an ethical violation even if proven, were not included in the reported statistics.
26. One of the cases concerned three lawyers. Disciplinary sanctions were imposed
on two of the lawyers; the third was exonerated. See Burns v. Clayton, 237 S.C. 316, 117
S.E.2d 300 (1960).
27. 237 S.C. 316, 117 S.E.2d 300 (1960).
28. Id. at 331, 117 S.E.2d at 307. Many other states follow a similar rule. See, e.g.,
Office of Disciplinary Counsel v. Green, 470 Pa. 164, 368 A.2d 245 (1976). A more narrow
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charges, does not automatically end grievance proceedings. In-
stead, such action may affect the gravity of any sanction found
justified under the circumstances. 2 A third principle established
in the first decade of the Board's existence is that, although a
lawyer always has the right to resign from the bar, the court may
refuse to accept a proffered resignation when it is tendered after
disciplinary proceedings before the Board have been instituted.30
III. DISCIPLINARY ENFORCEMENT IN SOUTH CAROLINA AFTER
1969
By the end of 1969, the supreme court had clearly estab-
lished its plenary power to regulate the conduct of lawyers ad-
mitted to practice in South Carolina,31 and had formed a viable
working relationship with the Board of Commissioners on Griev-
ances and Discipline. Although the Supreme Court Rule on Dis-
ciplinary Procedure contained many of the deficiencies specified
in the Clark Committee Report,3 2 the basic machinery for an ef-
fective disciplinary system was in place. The two most impor-
tant developments since 1969 are: (1) the supreme court's March
1, 1973, adoption of the American Bar Association Model Code
of Professional Responsibility,33 which replaced the Canons of
Ethics; and (2) the approval in January 1978 of substantial revi-
sions to the Rule on Disciplinary Procedure. 4 These revisions
29. See Cate v. Rivers, 246 S.C. 35, 142 S.E.2d 369 (1965); Norris v. Alexander, 246
S.C. 14, 142 S.E.2d 214 (1965).
30. See McLeod v. Chandler, 251 S.C. 305, 162 S.E.2d 256 (1968). See infra notes
157-62 and accompanying text.
31. See, e.g., State v. Holding, 12 S.C.L. (1 McCord) 379 (1821); S.C. CODE ANN. §§
40-5-10, 40-5-20 (1976).
32. One of the most serious defects was the requirement that all complaints be veri-
fied by the complainant and signed by a lawyer who agreed to act as the complainant's
legal counsel. By signing the complaint, the lawyer represented that he had investigated
the grievance and believed that reasonable cause for a hearing existed. Moreover, the
lawyer agreed to accept responsibility for prosecuting the complaint to conclusion. See
S.C. Sup. CT. R. Disc. P. § 7 (1976). These onerous requirements, which for obvious
reasons discouraged the filing of complaints, were eliminated in 1978. See Youngblood,
Revised Rule On Disciplinary Procedure, The Transcript, May, 1978, at 2.
33. S.C. Sup. CT. R. 32 (1976). In 1983, the American Bar Association approved the
ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct to replace the Code of Professional Responsi-
bility. At the time this Article was prepared, New Jersey was the only state that had
approved the ABA Model Rules, although several other states were considering their
adoption.
34. For a description of the changes, see Youngblood, supra note 32, at 2.
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basically incorporated the format recommended by the Ameri-




There are three basic institutional components of the South
Carolina disciplinary system: the Board of Commissioners on
Grievances and Discipline, the Attorney General's office and the
South Carolina Supreme Court. The supreme court selects the
members of the Board, who are appointed for a three year
term,3" and a Board Chairman. The number of Board members
equals the number of resident circuit court judges, currently
twenty-five. Board members must reside in the judicial circuit
from which they are appointed. The Supreme Court Rule on
Disciplinary Procedure also authorizes the chairman to request
the court to appoint associate commissioners to perform investi-
gative duties when the workload is heavy.3 7 At the present time
there are seven associate commissioners.
38
The Board rarely meets as a whole. Most of the decisions
that require review by a committee are handled by the Execu-
tive Committee,39 which consists of a chairman, appointed by
the supreme court, and four other members appointed by the
court at the recommendation of the incoming chairman. 40 The
Executive Committee reviews all grievances, oversees the prelim-
inary investigative process, directs the issuance of formal com-
plaints, reviews all findings and recommendations from hearing
panels, makes independent recommendations of sanctions to the
supreme court, and administers all private reprimands.4 1 The
35. See generally ABA JOINT CoMMITTEE ON PROFESSIONAL DISCIPLINE, STANDARDS
FOR LAWYER DISCIPLINE AND DISABILITY PROCEEDINGS (1979).
36. S.C. Sup. CT. R. Disc. P. § 3A (Supp. 1984).
37. Id. § 9E.
38. See SOUTH CAROLINA BAR LAWYER'S DESK BOOK D-11 (1984).
39. In the five year period from October 1, 1978, through September 30, 1983, the
full Board held one meeting. During the same period the Executive Committee held 50
meetings. See 1979-1983 BD. OF CoMM'Rs GRESv. & Disc. ANNUAL REPS.
40. S.C. Sup. CT. R. Disc. P. § 4A (Supp. 1984).
41. Id. §§ 4B, 9, 11, 14. Under § 11A of the Rule on Disciplinary Procedure, in
addition to the executive committee and the chairman of the Commission on Grievances
[Vol. 36
14
South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 36, Iss. 3 [], Art. 3
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol36/iss3/3
DISCIPLINARY ACTIONS
Board members (along with associate commissioners) conduct
investigations and hearings, which are conducted by panels of
three Board members.42
The Attorney General's office provides two types of input.
First, at the request of the Executive Committee, the Attorney
General's office will assist in the investigation of grievances. 43 As
a general rule, this request is made only in the more difficult,
technical cases such as those involving trust account violations.
Second, unless there is a disqualifying conflict of interest, the
Attorney General's office prosecutes all formal complaints to
conclusion.44 At present, there are six assistant attorneys general
who work part-time on disciplinary matters. One spends approx-
imately half of his time, three spend approximately one-fourth
of their time, and the remaining two, approximately one-tenth of
their time on disciplinary cases. These six are assisted by two
full time lay investigators on the Attorney General's staff.
45
In addition to appointing the members of the Board of
Commissioners on Grievances and Discipline, the supreme court
performs several other important functions in the disciplinary
process. Technically, the supreme court may review every griev-
ance presented to the Board. 4 As a practical matter, the court
cannot do so given the volume of grievances filed each year.41
The court does, however, review every case involving a panel
hearing.
48
The court also deals directly with certain types of special
cases. For example, the court, rather than the Board, handles all
grievances filed against a member of the Board of Commission-
and Discipline, a circuit or family court judge and a local bar association's grievance
committee can direct that a complaint be issued.
42. Id. §§ 9B, 9E, 12.
43. Id. § 9A.
44. Id. § 12D. When the Attorney General has a conflict of interest, the chairman of
the Board of Commissioners on Grievances and Discipline appoints a practitioner to
serve as the prosecutor.
45. Telephone interview with Richard B. Kale, Jr., Esquire, Senior Assistant South
Carolina Attorney General (Aug. 7, 1984).
46. S.C. Sup. CT. R. Disc. P. § 25 (Supp. 1984).
47. The chairman, however, must maintain written records of the disposition of
every grievance submitted to the Board. Id. § 4C.
48. Id. §§ 14A(3), 14B. The supreme court also reviews complaints when both the
panel report and the executive committee recommend dismissal. See In re Belser, 277
S.C. 25, 287 S.E.2d 139 (1982).
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ers on Grievances and Discipline. 4 The special processing of
such grievances is designed to minimize the danger that charges
of bias or favoritism will be leveled against the Board. Addition-
ally, the court must enter an order temporarily suspending a
lawyer from practice when it receives official notice that a lawyer
has been convicted of a serious crime,50 a term that is broadly
defined to include all felonies and other crimes involving moral
turpitude. 1 The file on the suspended lawyer is then referred to
the Board where action on it is held in abeyance until the lawyer
has concluded all direct appeals.2 If the conviction is reversed
on appeal, the court will reinstate the lawyer, but the reinstate-
ment does not terminate the pending disciplinary action.5 3 If the
conviction is upheld, a panel of the Board hears the disciplinary
case to determine the appropriate sanction.5 4 The court also en-
ters orders transferring lawyers with serious emotional or physi-
cal problems to disability inactive status.55 A lawyer may not
practice law while he is in this status. Any pending disciplinary
proceedings against a lawyer in this status are held in
abeyance.58
Additionally, at the request of the Board or the Executive
Committee, the court may issue an order temporarily sus-
pending or imposing probation on a lawyer who "appears to be
causing great public harm by misappropriating funds to his own
use, or otherwise. '57 If a lawyer is temporarily suspended under
such an order, he or she is precluded from accepting new cases
but, with permission of the court, may continue to represent ex-
isting clients for thirty days provided all fees collected during
that period are deposited in a special trust account. The funds
in such a special trust account may be withdrawn only upon
49. S.C. Sup. CT. R. Disc. P. § 10 (Supp. 1984).
50. Id. § 6A.
51. Id. § 20. For the purposes of this rule, pleas of guilty or nolo contendere are
considered convictions.
52. Id. § 6C. See In re Caskey, 276 S.C. 410, 279 S.E.2d 129 (1981) (habeas corpus
petition is not an appeal for purposes of disciplinary rules).
53. S.C. Sup. CT. R. Disc. P. § 6E (Supp. 1984).
54. Id. § 6B. The conviction is conclusive evidence of the crime and the only issue
on review of the panel's recommendation is the appropriate sanction. See In re Rish, 273
S.C. 365, 256 S.E.2d 540 (1979).
55. S.C. Sup. CT. R. Disc. P. § 19 (Supp. 1984).
56. Id. § 19B. See In re Philips, 280 S.C. 2, 310 S.E.2d 433 (1984).
57. S.C. Sup. CT. R. Disc. P. § 7B (Supp. 1984).
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conditions set forth in the court's order. 8 If the order places the
lawyer on probation, he or she is precluded from withdrawing
any funds from existing bank accounts except as authorized in
the probation order.59 The supreme court also makes the final
determination on all petitions for reinstatement of lawyers who
have been temporarily or indefinitely suspended or placed on
disability inactive status."
2. Processing of Grievances
As Table 1 indicates,6' between January 1970 and the mid-
dle of 1984, 137 lawyers admitted to practice in South Carolina
have received some form of public disciplinary sanction and 60
have been privately reprimanded. As impressive as these figures
are, the cases that result in sanctions represent only a small per-
centage of the total grievances filed. According to the 1983 An-
nual Report of the Board of Commissioners on Grievances and
Discipline, the Board received a total of 344 grievance 2 inquiries
between October 1, 1982, and September 30, 1983.6 During the
same period, the chairman and the Executive Committee dis-
missed 306 grievances, or 89.4% of the grievances filed, after a
preliminary investigation or a hearing.6 4 Based on available evi-
dence, the Board's dismissal rate for the 1983 reporting period is
not significantly different from that of other jurisdictions.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id. §§ 6A, 7B, 19F-H, 37.
61. See Table 1.
62. A grievance is defined in the Rules on Disciplinary Procedure as "any accusation
of misconduct against an attorney which has not resulted in a complaint." S.C. Sup. CT.
R. Disc. P. § 2F (1976). A complaint is defined as a "formal written document alleging
misconduct" that is issued after an investigation of a grievance reveals that there is
probable cause for a grievance hearing. Id. § 2D.
63. 1983 BD. CoMM'Rs GRIEV. & Disc. ANNUAL REP., reprinted in The Transcript,
Nov., 1983, at 7. The Transcript is a monthly publication of the South Carolina Bar
Association.
64. Id. Some of these dismissals concerned grievances filed in prior years. The exact
number of carryover cases cannot be determined from the report.
65. See, e.g., Econ. Develop. Council of N.Y.C., Inc. Task Force, Analysis of the
Grievance System of the Association of the Bar of the City of New York, 34 REc. A.B.
CITY N.Y. 561, 565, 579 (1979) (California, Illinois, Michigan, and the First Department
of New York City dismiss from 85% to 97% of all grievances); Steele & Nimmer, supra
note 2, at 982 (survey showed dismissal rate is over 90%). In the 1982 reporting period,
the dismissal rate by the Board was only 67.4% (265 dismissals of 393 filed grievances).
1985]
17
Haynsworth: Disciplinary Actions by the South Carolina Supreme Court and the
Published by Scholar Commons,
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
During this same reporting period, a total of thirty-three
formal complaints were served.6 This statistic is critical because
disciplinary sanctions arise only from complaints.67 The issuance
of a complaint, however, does not automatically result in the im-
position of a sanction. From October 1, 1982, through September
30, 1983, twenty disciplinary sanctions were imposed and one
lawyer resigned while under investigation for ethical improprie-
ties.0 8 Although the Board would have processed many of these
complaints in prior years, it is not inappropriate to conclude
from these figures that approximately 7.5% of all grievances
filed with the Board result in some form of disciplinary sanction
or resignation. As low as this figure may seem, it is not out of
line with the experience in other states.6
Thus, there is a significant winnowing process that takes
place in the disciplinary system. The process takes place in three
procedural stages: (1) the pre-complaint stage, (2) the hearing
stage, and (3) the appellate stage. As the above statistics indi-
cate, there are progressively fewer cases dismissed at each stage.
The reasons for this decline in dismissals is discussed in the fol-
lowing materials.
a. Pre-Complaint Stage
Anyone may file a grievance. Although the Board of Com-
missioners on Grievances and Discipline does not publish data
on the origin of grievances, available statistics from other juris-
dictions indicate that disgruntled clients submit the vast major-
ity of grievances and that lawyers, judges, and local grievance
1982 Ba. CoMiM's GRIEV. & Disc. ANNUAL REP., reprinted in The Transcript, Nov., 1982,
at 4.
66. 1983 BD. CoMa'Rs GRmV. & Disc. ANNUAL REP., supra note 63, at 7.
67. See supra note 62 and accompanying text for an explanation of the difference
between a grievance and a complaint.
68. See 1983 BD. COMM'RS GRIEV. & Disc. ANNUAL REP., supra note 63, at 7. The
annual report states that nine resignations occurred, although only one case concerned a
lawyer who, at the time, was under investigation for ethical improprieties.
69. See Steele & Nimmer, supra note 2 (only four of seventeen jurisdictions studied
had a sanction rate of more than 8%). See also Marks & Cathcart, Discipline Within the
Legal Profession: Is It Self-Regulation?, 1974 ILL. L. FORUM 193, 214-216. The South
Carolina sanction ratio is apparently considerably higher than the national average. See
Lawscope, Tighter Discipline Shown by Statistics, 63 A.B.A. J. 24 (1977)(in 1975 the
national ratio of public discipline to grievance complaints was .02%).
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committees submit only a few each year.70 Most client griev-
ances involve contractual disputes rather than ethical violations
that warrant disciplinary sanctions. This is the principal reason
why such a high percentage of grievances are dismissed in the
pre-complaint stage. 1
The chairman of the Executive Committee reviews all
grievances first. Prior to 1978, before a grievance could be con-
sidered, a lawyer had to submit a written statement verified by
the complainant and signed by the lawyer, certifying that he had
investigated the grievance and believed that reasonable cause
existed for a hearing. The lawyer representing the complainant
also had to agree to prosecute the grievance to its conclusion.72
These verification requirements no longer apply. Nevertheless, a
written statement reciting the basic facts, signed by the com-
plainant, is necessary.7 3
If the chairman finds that the grievance does not contain
sufficient facts that, if true, would constitute misconduct war-
ranting a sanction,74 he will dismiss it on his own motion and
inform the complainant of this fact.75 In cases which involve fee
disputes, as opposed to those which involve excessive fees which
may result in disciplinary sanctions,76 the chairman advises the
70. See Steele & Nimmer, supra note 2, at 973 (study of Michigan disciplinary cases
revealed that only 8.1% of all complaints were filed by other members of the profession;
this figure includes cases initiated by the agency, such as criminal conviction cases).
71. See Steele & Nimmer, supra note 2, at 949-78; Marks & Cathcart, supra note
69, at 209-21.
72. The prior rule is published in the 1976 South Carolina Code. S.C. SUP. CT. R.
Disc. P. § 7 (1976). These requirements were published as part of the original version of
the Rule on Disciplinary Procedure.
73. The Supreme Court Rule on Disciplinary Procedure does not require that a
grievance be written, but the Board imposes this requirement through its internal rules.
The Board has the authority to adopt rules and regulations not inconsistent with the
Rule on Disciplinary Procedure. S.C. Sup. CT. R. Disc. P. § 3E(2)(Supp. 1984).
74. Misconduct is defined as a violation of the lawyer's oath of office, a violation of
the Code of Professional Responsibility, a conviction of a serious crime, or conduct that
tends to pollute the administration of justice, that brings the courts and the legal profes-
sion into disrepute, or that demonstrates a lack of professional competence. S.C. Sup. CT.
R. Disc. P. § 5 (Supp. 1984).
75. The state's disciplinary procedure rules do not require that the lawyer against
whom the grievance is filed be notified of the dismissal of these frivolous cases. Never-
theless, § 4C of the Rule does require that the chairman maintain a written record of
every "inquiry" and its disposition. The retention of files in these types of cases will be
discussed in more detail in a later section of this Article.
76. See S.C. Sup. CT. R. 32, DR 2-106 (Supp. 1984).
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complainant that the South Carolina Bar Resolution of Fee Dis-
putes Board has jurisdiction to resolve the dispute.77 According
to the 1983 Annual Report of the Board, the chairman dismissed
182 grievances, which represents fifty-three percent of the total
grievances filed during the reporting period.7 1 Unfortunately, the
Board of Commissioners on Grievances and Discipline does not
publish statistics describing the charges made in the grievances
that the chairman dismisses as frivolous. Data from other juris-
dictions, however, indicate that such charges involve fee dis-
putes, minor cases of communication failure, and clients who are
unhappy because a lawyer did not get as large a damage award
as was desired or failed to obtain an acquittal in a criminal
trial.19
Where the grievance, on its face, presents a question of seri-
ous ethical misconduct, the chairman will write a letter inform-
ing the lawyer in question of the grievance and requesting a re-
sponse.80 Depending on the seriousness of the charge, the
chairman may then, or after reviewing the respondent's response
and concluding that the charge is not frivolous, appoint a mem-
ber of the Board or an associate commissioner to investigate the
grievance.81 In particularly difficult or technical cases, such as
those involving trust account violations, the chairman usually
assigns the investigation to the Attorney General's office.82 The
investigative report is due within sixty days, unless the time is
extended by the chairman for good cause shown. 3
After it is filed, the Executive Committee reviews the inves-
77. The role of the Fee Dispute Board in the disciplinary process is discussed infra
at notes 253-56 and accompanying text.
78. 1983 BD. OF COMri'Rs GiuIv & Disc. ANNuAL REP., supra note 63, at 7. See also
Dubin & Schwartz, Survey and Analysis of Michigan's Disciplinary System for Law-
yers, 61 U. DET. J. URB. L. 1, 6 (1983) (60% of all grievances dismissed by bar counsel).
79. See supra note 71 and accompanying text.
80. The Supreme Court Rule on Disciplinary Procedure does not, however, require
that the lawyer against whom a grievance is filed be officially notified of the charge until
a formal complaint is issued. Compare S.C. Sup. CT. R. Disc. P. § 9D (Supp. 1984)("An
attorney who is the subject of an investigation may be informed in writing of the allega-
tions of misconduct made against him. . .") with id. § 13A ("The Board ... shall cause
a copy of the Complaint together with notice of requirement of Answer to be mailed to
the Respondent. . .")(emphasis added).
81. See S.C. Sup. CT. R. Disc. P. §§ 9A, 9E (Supp. 1984).
82. Id. § 9A(2).
83. Id. § 9B. Broad subpoena power under the seal of the supreme court is available,
if needed, to assist in the investigation. See id. § 23.
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tigative reports4 and decides whether to dismiss the grievance or
to request the issuance of a complaint. The Executive Commit-
tee requests complaints only in those cases in which it finds a
prima facie case of ethical misconduct. Essentially, the Execu-
tive Committee makes a probable cause determination similar to
that made by a grand jury when deciding to issue an
indictment.
8 5
Not surprisingly, on the basis of the investigative report, the
Executive Committee dismisses a large percentage of the griev-
ances it reviews. In 1983, the Executive Committee dismissed
124 grievances and requested the issuance of 32 complaints, a
ratio of 4 to 1.86 The high dismissal rate is due primarily to the
large number of grievances filed by disgruntled clients. As might
be expected, a preliminary investigation reveals that most com-
plaints involve contractual disputes rather than disciplinary rule
violations.8 7
b. The Hearing Stage
The issuance of a complaint is the first step in the hearing
stage. Most complaints are issued at the direction of the Execu-
tive Committee s after an investigation of grievances filed by cli-
ents, lawyers, judges, and other third parties. Complaints are
also issued in two other types of cases which are internally gen-
erated. The first type of case involves a lawyer who has entered
a guilty or nolo contendere plea or who has been convicted of a
serious crime and has exhausted all direct appeals8 9 As pointed
84. Id. § 9C.
85. As will be discussed in more detail in the next subsection, a disciplinary hearing
is not a criminal proceeding and the respondent may not claim the full panoply of con-
stitutional rights available to criminal defendants. One application of this difference is
found in the disciplinary rule that gives the Executive Committee the discretion to de-
cide whether the respondent will be allowed to make an oral presentation at the time the
investigative report is reviewed. See id.
86. 1983 BD. CoMM'RS GRmv. & Disc. ANNUAL REP., supra note 63, at 7.
87. See supra note 71 and accompanying text.
88. Complaints may also be filed at the direction of a local grievance committee, a
judge, the Board chairman, and the vote of five or more commissioners. S.C. Sup. CT. R.
Disc. P. § 11A (Supp. 1984). It is not clear what would happen if the majority of the
Executive Committee or a majority of the Board objected to a request by anyone else
authorized by § 9E to direct the issuance of complaints.
89. S.C. Sup. CT. R. Disc. P. § 6 (Supp. 1984). Convictions of crimes that are not
serious are handled in the same manner as other grievances.
3291985]
21
Haynsworth: Disciplinary Actions by the South Carolina Supreme Court and the
Published by Scholar Commons,
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
out above,9" the supreme court temporarily suspends such a law-
yer upon official notification of the conviction, and refers the
case to the Board for a panel hearing. Assuming the conviction
is upheld, the Rule on Disciplinary Procedure provides that the
certificate of conviction is "conclusive evidence of the commis-
sion of that crime."9 1 In other words, the only issue the panel
considers in such a situation is the appropriate sanction to be
imposed. For this purpose the Court has held that:
While the respondent should be given ample latitude to fully
present evidence as to mitigating and extenuating circum-
stances, he should not be allowed to present evidence inconsis-
tent with the essential elements of the crime for which he has
been convicted. As is characteristic of most general rules of evi-
dence, the application of same must be left in considerable
measure to the sound discretion of the Hearing Panel.2
The second type of complaint that arises internally involves
cases in which a lawyer admitted to practice in South Carolina is
disciplined in another jurisdiction. Upon receiving notification of
the other state's disciplinary action, 3 the court refers the case to
the Board for a hearing to recommend whether the same sanc-
tion should be imposed in South Carolina.9 4 Unless the respon-
dent shows that (1) the procedure in the other jurisdiction vio-
lated his or her rights to due process, (2) there is a "clear
conviction" that the evidence presented was insufficient to sup-
port the charges, (3) the imposition of the identical sanction
"would result in a grave injustice," or (4) the misconduct "war-
rants substantially different discipline in this State," the same
sanction is imposed. 5 Thus far, no respondent has convinced
90. See supra notes 50-52 and accompanying text.
91. S.C. Sup. CT. R. Disc. P. § 6B (Supp. 1984).
92. In re Rish, 273 S.C. 365, 369, 256 S.E.2d 540, 542 (1979).
93. The American Bar Association National Center for Professional Responsibility
maintains a National Discipline Data Bank. Disciplinary agencies report all public disci-
plinary sanction cases to the center, which in turn sends notice of the sanction to all
other states where the disciplined lawyer is admitted to practice. South Carolina is a
participant in the National Discipline Data Bank.
94. S.C. Sup. CT. R. Disc. P. § 29 (Supp. 1984). The Rule on Disciplinary Procedure
gives the supreme court the authority to impose the reciprocal sanction directly, but the
court routinely refers such cases to the grievance board for a hearing and
recommendation.
95. Id. § 29D.
[Vol. 36
22
South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 36, Iss. 3 [], Art. 3
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol36/iss3/3
DISCIPLINARY ACTIONS
the court that one of these exceptions should apply. 8
The procedures applicable to cases in which a complaint has
been ordered follow a tightly prescribed format. To understand
these procedures, it is first necessary to be aware of the basic
nature of disciplinary proceedings. Technically, disciplinary pro-
ceedings are not considered civil or criminal in nature but are
considered sui generis.97 Some but not all of the constitutional
rights applicable to criminal trials apply to disciplinary proceed-
ings.98 The privilege against self-incrimination applies,9 but not
as fully as in a criminal case. For example, in some states a law-
yer's testimony under a grant of immunity may be used in a dis-
ciplinary action against the lawyer without violating the privi-
lege.""0 Generally, the court has held that a respondent must
receive notice of the charges,101 has the right to confront wit-
nesses, and has the right to the assistance of counsel. 0 2 On the
other hand, a respondent does not have a right to a jury trial.
10 3
Furthermore, the court has held that a disciplinary proceeding
does not deny due process, even though the judiciary controls
the entire disciplinary process by acting directly or indirectly as
rule maker, accusor, prosecutor, fact-finder, and sanction im-
96. Through June 1984, the South Carolina Supreme Court had issued four recipro-
cal disciplinary decisions, all of which imposed a sanction identical to that imposed by
the other states, or the nearest equivalent South Carolina sanction. See In re Lanier, 279
S.C. 458, 309 S.E.2d 754 (1983); In re Zimmerman, 277 S.C. 342, 287 S.E.2d 474 (1982);
In re Chance, 276 S.C. 1, 274 S.E.2d 422 (1981); In re Major, 275 S.C. 251, 269 S.E.2d
345 (1980).
97. See, e.g., In re Echeles, 430 F.2d 347 (7th Cir. 1970); Office of Disciplinary Coun-
sel v. Campbell, 463 Pa. 472, 345 A.2d 616, cert. denied, 424 U.S. 926 (1976).
98. See generally Note, Disbarment In the United States: Who Shall Do The
Noisome Work, 12 COLUM. J.L. & Soc. PROS. 1, 17-31 (1975); Gray & Harrison, Stan-
dards For Lawyer Discipline and Disability Proceedings and the Evaluation of Lawyer
Discipline Systems, 11 CAP. U.L. REv. 529, 538-43 (1982); Nordby, The Burdened Privi-
lege: Defending Lawyers in Disciplinary Proceedings, 30 S.C.L. REv. 363, 383-93 (1979).
99. See Spevack v. Klein, 385 U.S. 511 (1967).
100. See In re Daley, 549 F.2d 469 (7th Cir.), cert. denied 434 U.S. 829 (1977); In re
Epstein, 37 A.D.2d 333, 325 N.Y.S.2d 657 (1971). See also Annot., 30 A.L.R.4th 243
(1984). Several states have held that illegally obtained evidence is admissible in a disci-
plinary hearing. See, e.g., People v. Harfmann, 638 P.2d 745 (Col. 1981); McInnis v.
State, 618 S.W.2d 389 (Tex. Civ. App. 1981).
101. See In re Ruffalo, 390 U.S. 544 (1968).
102. See, e.g., Louisiana State Bar Ass'n v. Levy, 292 So. 2d 492 (La. 1974). But see
McGrath v. State Bar of Cal., 21 Cal. 2d 737, 135 P.2d 1 (1943).
103. See Ex parte Wall, 107 U.S. 265, 288 (1883). Only two states, Texas and Geor-
gia, allow jury trials in disciplinary cases. See Nordby, supra note 98, at 388.
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poser. 104 Finally, the burden of proof adopted by most jurisdic-
tions is a "clear and convincing" standard, 10 5 which is a standard
higher than the "preponderance of evidence" test applicable in
civil trials but lower than the "beyond a reasonable doubt" stan-
dard applicable in criminal trials.
The procedural requirements of the South Carolina Su-
preme Court Rule on Disciplinary Procedure fall within these
guidelines. Following the issuance of a complaint, a proceeding
is conducted in a manner similar to that of a civil case. In fact,
the rule states that, unless otherwise provided, the rules of civil
procedure and rules of evidence apply. 06 Some exceptions are
specified, however. For example, the good cause shown rule ap-
plicable in civil trials is not applicable to pleading amendments
and motions.0 7 Additionally, discovery by the respondent is
available only with permission of the chairman and for good
cause shown. 08
The Rule on Disciplinary Procedure imposes stringent
deadlines. 09 The complaint must be issued within thirty days
after a request by the Executive Committee.1 0 The respondent
must be personally served with a copy of the complaint or re-
ceive it by registered mail,"' and must file an answer within
twenty days after receipt of the complaint, unless the time is
extended by the chairman." 2 Failure to file an answer consti-
tutes an admission of the charges," 3 whereupon the only issue
that the panel may consider at the hearing is the severity of the
104. See e.g., Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S. 35 (1975); In re Baun, 395 Mich. 28, 232
N.W.2d 621 (1975).
105. See, e.g., In re Dodge, 93 Minn. 160, 100 N.W. 684 (1904). See generally
Nordby, supra note 98, at 391-92.
106. See S.C. Sup. CT. R. Disc. P. § 24A (Supp. 1984).
107. Compare S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-30-90 (1976) with S.C. Sup. CT. R. Disc. P. §
24A (Supp. 1984).
108. S.C. Sup. CT. R. Disc. P. § 23D (Supp. 1984).
109. The rule states that time limitations specified are directory and administrative
rather than jurisdictional and thus will not justify abatement of the proceedings. Id. §
24B.
110. Id. § 13A.
111. Id. Service of the complaint on a nonresident lawyer is made on the Clerk of
the South Carolina Supreme Court and a copy is sent by registered mail to the lawyer's
last known address. Id.
112. Id. § 13B.
113. Id. § 13C.
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sanction.114 The chairman must set a hearing date not later than
sixty days from the date of the complaint service.11 5 The chair-
man may grant one thirty day continuance for good cause. Only
the chief justice of the supreme court may grant a further con-
tinuance "upon a showing of extradordinary circumstances.' ' 1 6
Although a respondent is not entitled as a matter of right to
appear before the Executive Committee at the time the investi-
gative report is reviewed,117 the panel hearing is a true adver-
sarial proceeding with the right to counsel, to crossexamine wit-
nesses including the complainant, and to subpoena records and
witnesses needed for the respondent's defense. 1 8 The testimony
of all witnesses is absolutely privileged, however, and therefore
the respondent may not file a lawsuit against the complainant or
other witness based on testimony given in the proceeding."' The
court has held that violation of this prohibition constitutes a
ground for disciplinary sanction. 20 Furthermore, unless the re-
spondent requests otherwise in writing, all the proceedings are
completely confidential until such time as the supreme court au-
thorizes publication of an opinion containing a public sanction,
temporary suspension, or transfer to disability inactive status.
12 1
At that point, only the supreme court's order is available for
public inspection. The file itself is not subject to disclosure, 22
114. See In re Davis, 279 S.C. 433, 309 S.E.2d 5 (1983); In re Hines, 275 S.C. 271,
269 S.E.2d 766 (1980).
115. S.C. Sup. CT. R. Disc. P. § 12C (Supp. 1984).
116. Id.
117. Id. § 9D.
118. Id. § 23. If the pleadings raise no issues of fact, no hearing is required unless
the respondent requests a hearing to present mitigation factors for the appropriate sanc-
tion. Id. § 12B.
119. Id. § 26A.
120. See In re Edwards, 279 S.C. 89, 302 S.E.2d 339 (1983) (public reprimand issued
for violation).
121. See S.C. Sup. CT. R. Disc. P. §§ 6A, 7B, 19D, 20 (Supp. 1984). A copy of any
complaint and answer will be fowarded to the chief circuit judge in the circuit where the
respondent maintains an office. Id. § 20D. The chief circuit judge is also notified of the
final disposition of the complaint, but the judge may not disclose the existence of the
complaint to anyone else unless "necessary to protect the public." Id.
122. When a public sanction is imposed on a respondent following conviction of a
serious crime or public discipline is imposed in another jurisdiction, that part of the file
pertaining to the crime, or the opinion issued in the other state where a public sanction
has been issued, is considered part of the public record available for disclosure. Id. §
20A. For a discussion of public access to disciplinary records, see generally Annot., 83
A.L.R.3d 727 (1978); Annot., 83 A.L.R.3d 777 (1978).
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and the witnesses and all other persons connected with the pro-
ceeding are forbidden to discuss it with anyone.12
The hearing panels consist of three members of the Board.
Board members who served as investigators in the pre-complaint
stage of the case, who live in the same judicial circuit as the
respondent, or who would be disqualified under the recusal stan-
dards applicable to judges cannot serve on the panel.1 24 This
rule minimizes the danger that a disciplinary procedure will be
unconstitutionally tainted by bias.125 The South Carolina Attor-
ney General's office acts as the prosecutor at the panel hear-
ing. 126 The Attorney General must prove the respondent's mis-
conduct by clear and convincing evidence to justify a sanction.1 27
The Rule on Disciplinary Procedure specifies that the hearing
panel must file its report within sixty days after receipt of the
transcript. The report must contain the panel's findings of fact,
conclusions of law, and recommended sanctions, together with
all other documents in the file.128 The chairman may authorize a
sixty day extension for good cause shown. 12 The filing of the
hearing panel report begins the appellate process.
c. Appellate Stage
A panel report may be appealed first to the Executive Com-
mittee of the Board and then to the supreme court. Both the
respondent and the Attorney General may file exceptions and
supporting briefs at each level. The parties must file exceptions
and briefs with the Executive Committee within twenty days af-
ter receipt of the panel report. 3° The Executive Committee
123. S.C. Sup. CT. R. Disc. P. § 20D (Supp. 1984).
124. Id. §§ 3D, 12F.
125. See, e.g., In re Baun, 395 Mich. 28, 232 N.W.2d 621 (1975).
126. S.C. Sup. CT. R. Disc. P. § 12C (Supp. 1984).
127. Cf. In re Clarke, 278 S.C. 627, 300 S.E.2d 595 (1983); In re Harvey, 278 S.C.
101, 292 S.E.2d 595 (1982); In re Rish, 273 S.C. 365, 256 S.E.2d 540 (1979). Section 24 of
the Rule on Disciplinary Procedure authorizes amendments to the complaint and to any
other pleading at any time before the final order of the supreme court. S.C. Sup. CT. R.
Disc. P. § 24 (Supp. 1984). The rule specifies that the affected party shall be given a
reasonable opportunity to contest the new material. Id. Under this rule, charges against
a respondent not made in the complaint may be raised during the course of the hearing.
128. S.C. SuP. CT. R. Disc. P. § 12E (Supp. 1984).
129. Id.
130. Id. § 14A.
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must review the entire record at its first meeting following the
expiration of this twenty day time limit.131 The Rule on Discipli-
nary Procedure does not specifically authorize oral arguments
before the Executive Committee, but presumably the Executive
Committee has inherent discretion to grant a request for oral
argument. The Executive Committee may remand the case to
the panel for additional testimony, or it may take additional tes-
timony.3 2 After completing its review of the record, the Execu-
tive Committee prepares its report containing any amendments
to the findings by the panel and its "independent recommenda-
tion as to sanctions." 33 This report and the other records in the
file are then forwarded to the supreme court.
The supreme court sets a hearing date after it receives certi-
fication of the record and the Executive Committee's report.
The court must hold its hearing not less than forty days after
giving the respondent notice of the hearing,134 and the respon-
dent must file his exceptions and brief at least twenty days prior
to the scheduled date of the hearing.13 5 The Attorney General
must file exceptions and a brief within fifteen days after the re-
spondent's brief is filed. 36
If the sanction recommended is a private reprimand, and
neither the respondent nor the Attorney General files exceptions
to the recommendation, then the private reprimand will become
the final order in the case unless the supreme court notifies the
Board to the contrary within sixty days after the record has
been certified to the court. The chairman then administers the
reprimand to the respondent at a subsequent Board or Execu-




134. Id. § 15A.
135. Id. § 15B.
136. Id. § 15C.
137. Id. § 14B. When the Rule on Disciplinary Procedure was issued in 1958, a
panel recommended and issued a private reprimand to the respondent. In 1975, the Rule
was changed to require that the full Board review all panel reports. The Board adminis-
tered a private reprimand if it deemed the action appropriate. The supreme court did
not review the file, however, unless the case was appealed by either the respondent or the
Attorney General. The requirement of automatic review by the supreme court of all cases
in which a panel report has been issued was added as part of the changes in the Rule on
Disciplinary Procedure made in 1978.
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the panel and Executive Committee recommend dismissal of a
complaint. If the Attorney General's office files no exceptions,
the dismissal becomes effective within sixty days after certifica-
tion of the record, unless the court notifies the Board that it
intends to take further action.
138
The supreme court may, in its discretion, order a hearing
before issuing its final order.139 Although the Board's recommen-
dations are merely advisory, they carry great weight. The court
reserves the right to make independent findings of fact 40 and to
impose whatever sanction the majority of the justices determines
to be appropriate.14 ' An examination of the published discipli-
nary cases through June 30, 1984, indicates that the court re-
jected the Board's recommendation in forty-nine cases and ac-
cepted the Board's recommendation in eighty-nine cases. In
other words, the court rejected the Board's recommendation in
approximately thirty-five percent of the cases in which the opin-
ion reports the Board's action. In thirty-nine of these cases, the
court imposed a more severe sanction than the Board recom-
mended. In the remaining ten, the court imposed a less severe
sanction than the Board recommended. In eleven of the forty-
nine cases, however, the court imposed the same penalty that
was recommended by the hearing panel. Therefore, the Court
imposed a sanction different from that recommended by both
the Board and the hearing panel in thirty-eight cases. Regard-
less of the figures used, it is clear that the court has exercised its
discretion to impose a sanction different from that recom-
mended by the Board and hearing panel in a significant number
of cases and that it has imposed a more severe sanction in far
more cases than it has imposed a less severe sanction.
138. Id. § 14B. As it was worded when originally issued in 1958, the Rule on Disci-
plinary Procedure stated that, if a panel recommended dismissal, the proceeding ended.
In 1975 the Rule was amended to require review of dismissal orders by the full Board,
but supreme court review was not required. Automatic review of dismissals by the su-
preme court was added as part of the 1978 amendments to the Rule.
139. Id. § 17.
140. See In re Belser, 277 S.C. 250, 287 S.E.2d 139 (1982); In re Brooks, 274 S.C.
601, 267 S.E.2d 74 (1980); In re Friday, 263 S.C. 156, 208 S.E.2d 535 (1974).
141. See, e.g., In re Pride, 276 S.C. 363, 278 S.E.2d 774 (1981) (respondent has the
burden of showing why the Executive Committee's recommended sanction should not be
followed); In re Smith, 255 S.C. 347, 179 S.E.2d 35 (1971); Burns v. Clayton, 237 S.C.
316, 117 S.E.2d 300 (1960).
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3. Imposition of Sanctions
The Rule on Disciplinary Procedure authorizes five types of
sanctions: permanent disbarment, indefinite suspension, tempo-
rary suspension for a fixed term not to exceed two years, public
reprimand, and private reprimand.'42 With the exception of a
private reprimand, which is administered by the Board of Com-
missioners on Grievances and Discipline, the sanctions are pub-
lished in an opinion issued by the supreme court. Costs of the
disciplinary proceeding can be assessed against the respon-
dent. 43 The order imposing the disciplinary sanction may also
require the respondent to disgorge any fee when the retention of
the fee would be "unconscionable, inequitable, or inconsistent
with the findings of misconduct.'1 44 Moreover, in cases involving
sanctions imposed because of incompetence, the order may re-
quire appropriate remedial action, presumably including addi-
tional law school coursework
45
In addition to the above sanctions, the supreme court will
automatically temporarily suspend a lawyer convicted of a seri-
ous crime until the conviction is reversed or the lawyer receives
one of the above sanctions after a hearing before a panel and
review by the court. 46 The court may also temporarily suspend
or place on probation any lawyer upon a showing "that the at-
torney appears to be causing great public harm by misappropri-
ating funds for his own use, or otherwise."'1 47 Finally, the court
may order the transfer to disability inactive status of any lawyer
suffering from serious emotional and physical problems, which
142. S.C. SuP. CT. R. Disc. P. § 7A (Supp. 1984). The authorization for temporary
suspension was added by an amendment approved October 17, 1984. See Davis Advance
Sheets No. 51, October 27, 1984.
143. Id. § 17.
144. Id. § 7A. Disgorgement does not affect the client's right to pursue any civil
remedy against the respondent nor does it immunize the respondent against criminal
sanctions. Id. The disgorgement provision was added to the Rule on Disciplinary Proce-
dure in October 1983. Prior to that time, the supreme court had on several occasions
ordered repayment of fees in excessive fee and neglect cases. See, e.g., In re Burgess, 275
S.C. 315, 270 S.E.2d 436 (1980) (excessive fee); In re Treacy, 277 S.C. 514. 290 S.E.2d 240
(1982) (neglect).
145. S.C. SuP. CT. R. Disc. P. § 7A (Supp. 1984). None of the published disciplinary
decisions indicate that this provision has ever been invoked.
146. Id. § 6.
147. Id. § 7B.
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order has the same effect as an order of temporary suspension.148
Although orders in these cases are public,149 they are not pub-
lished in the South Carolina Reports or the Southeastern
Reporter. 150
a. Consent Sanctions and Resignations
Special rules govern sanctions imposed with the consent of
the respondent and resignations by lawyers being investigated
by the Board for ethical improprieties. The Supreme Court Rule
on Disciplinary Procedure contains two sections regulating con-
sent sanctions. The first section allows a respondent to consent
to disbarment by filing an affidavit with the Board admitting the
material facts and stating that the consent is "freely and volun-
tarily rendered." 151 The court publishes the fact that the respon-
dent has consented to disbarment in an order, but the contents
of the affidavit and the underlying facts are kept confidential. 15 2
A respondent may, at any time after service of the com-
plaint, tender a conditional admission to one or more of the
charges contained in the complaint and indicate a sanction
which the respondent is willing to accept. 153 This consent is sub-
mitted to the Executive Committee for its recommendation and
is then reviewed by the supreme court. 1 4 If the supreme court
accepts the consent, it is published as part of the court's final
order.1 55 On the other hand, if the court rejects the consent, the
148. Id. § 19.
149. Id. §§ 6A, 7B, 19D. The Rule was changed in October 1982 to make temporary
suspension orders public.
150. These orders are published in the Supreme Court slip opinions, however. A
notice of the suspension is also sent to The Transcript and to the clerk of court in any
county in which the respondent maintained an office. A certified copy is also sent to the
chief circuit judge in each district. S.C. Sup. CT. R. Disc. P. § 31 (Supp. 1984).
151. Id. § 27A.
152. Id. § 27C. See In re Alexander, 278 S.C. 281, 294 S.E.2d 784 (1982). Through
June 1984, disbarment by consent, which was authorized as part of the 1978 amend-
ments to the Rule on Disciplinary Procedure, had been approved in four cases.
153. S.C. Sup. CT. R. Disc. P. § 28 (Supp. 1984). See In re Gamble, 278 S.C. 651, 300
S.E.2d 737 (1983) (consent to public reprimand).
154. S.C. Sup. CT. R. Disc. P. § 28 (Supp. 1984).
155. There is no provision in § 28 of the Rule on Disciplinary Procedure similar to §
27C, which regulates disbarment by consent, requiring confidentiality of the underlying
facts. Presumably the court will disclose the underlying facts in its order. See In re Gam-
ble, 278 S.C. 651, 300 S.E.2d 737 (1983).
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case proceeds as if the conditional admission had never been
made.
151
Resignations during pending disciplinary proceedings are
not specifically covered by the Rule on Disciplinary Proce-
dure. 157 The court has on several occasions refused to accept a
tendered resignation and has indicated this fact in the disbar-
ment order. 58 Until recently, however, it was quite difficult to
determine the cases in which the court had accepted a resigna-
tion when disciplinary proceedings were pending. The only dif-
ferentiation in a published opinion between this type of resigna-
tion and a voluntary resignation was the designation of the
resignation as "irrevocable. 1 5 9 Presumably, the court did not in-
clude this term in voluntary resignation orders because a lawyer
who voluntarily resigns is eligible for readmission to the bar by
complying with the reinstatement requirements in the Rule on
Disciplinary Procedure.
160
In April 1984, the supreme court informed the Board of
Commissioners on Grievances and Discipline that it will include
the following language in all cases in which resignations of attor-
neys with pending disciplinary proceedings are accepted: "The
Respondent is before the Court pursuant to a complaint con-
cerning violation of the Disciplinary Rules. The Respondent has
admitted ethical infractions and has submitted his resignation,
conditioned upon never reapplying for admission. The Court
considers it would be in the best interest of justice to grant the
resignation."'' This language avoids the confusion that previ-
ously existed in such cases. Except for the substitution of "resig-
156. S.C. Sup. CT. R. Disc. P. § 28 (Supp. 1984). Evidence that consent was rejected
may not be used against the respondent in the hearing. See ABA JOINT COMMrITTEE ON
PROFESSIONAL DISCIPLINE, STANDARDS7 FOR LAWYER DISCIPLINE AND DISABILITY PROCEED-
INGS § 11.2 commentary (1979).
157. However, the Rule on Disciplinary Procedure states that all resignations shall
be referred by the supreme court to the Board of Commissioners on Grievances and
Discipline for its recommendation. S.C. Sup. CT. R. Disc. P. § 31 (Supp. 1984). Rule 31
covers resignations for any reason, not merely those submitted after the institution of a
disciplinary action against the resigning lawyer. Id.
158. See, e.g., In re Bonnette, 278 S.C. 452, 298 S.E.2d 215 (1982). Through June
1984, the supreme court rejected proffered resignations in eight cases. Resignations were
accepted in 13 cases.
159. See, e.g., In re Gasque, 270 S.C. 96, 240 S.E.2d 648 (1978).
160. See S.C. Sup. CT. R. Disc. P. § 8E (Supp. 1984).
161. Letter from the Deputy Clerk of the South Carolina Supreme Court to the
Board of Commissioners on Grievances and Discipline (April 6, 1984).
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nation" for "disbarment," such a resignation is now essentially
the same as a disbarment by consent decree. A respondent, how-
ever, enjoys one advantage by such a resignation: the ability to
maintain publicly that he or she has never been disbarred.
b. Effect of Disbarment, Suspension and Resignation
All disbarred, suspended, and resigned lawyers must surren-
der their licenses to practice. 162 These lawyers must also notify
all clients that they will no longer be able to represent them, and
must advise the clients to obtain another lawyer of their
choice.163 Additionally, within fifteen days after the issuance of
the supreme court's order, these lawyers must file an affidavit of
compliance with the notice requirement with the supreme court
and the Board of Commissioners on Grievances and Discipline.
The affidavit must contain an address where the lawyer can
thereafter be reached and a list of all other jurisdictions in
which he or she is admitted to practice.6 If a respondent fails
to comply with this requirement, the chairman of the Board of
Commissioners on Grievances and Discipline may appoint one or
more lawyers to inventory the respondent's files and to take any
action necessary to protect the interests of the respondent and
his or her clients.'65
A lawyer who has been disbarred, suspended, or who has
resigned while under investigation for ethical misconduct is pro-
hibited not only from the practice of law but also from employ-
ment in any capacity in a law office. A practitioner who hires the
disbarred, suspended, or resigned lawyer, knowing of his or her
status, will be subject to discipline. 6 In 1980, the supreme court
held a disbarred lawyer in contempt for preparing and filing a
162. See In re Hines, 275 S.C. 411, 272 S.E.2d 169 (1980) (contempt citation for
refusal to surrender license).
163. S.C. Sup. CT. R. Disc. P. § 30 (Supp. 1984). In nonlitigation matters, notice
must also be given to any lawyer who represents an adverse party. Id. § 30B. The Board
of Commissioners on Grievances and Discipline must send a copy of the notice of sus-
pension or disbarment to The Transcript and to every chief circuit judge in South
Carolina.
164. S.C. Sup. CT. R. Disc. P. § 30C (Supp. 1984).
165. Id. § 33. See In re Towles, 265 S.C. 556, 220 S.E.2d 646 (1975).
166. S.C. Sup. CT. R. Disc. P. § 42 (Supp. 1984). This section was added to the Rule
on Disciplinary Procedure in December 1980.
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deed allegedly under the supervision of another practitioner.16
c. Reinstatement
The reinstatement of a suspended lawyer depends on the
circumstances of the suspension. If the suspension followed a
conviction of a serious crime, a lawyer is automatically rein-
stated by the supreme court following official notification of the
conviction's reversal. 168 If the court ordered the suspension
under section 7B of the Rule on Disciplinary Procedure, which
authorizes the court to temporarily suspend or to place on pro-
bation a lawyer who is under investigation for ethical violations
and "appears to be causing great public harm by misappropriat-
ing funds to his own use, or otherwise," the court may reinstate
the lawyer at any time after a hearing requesting dissolution of
the suspension or probation order.
169
More rigorous requirements apply for the reinstatement of
lawyers on disability inactive status and lawyers temporarily or
indefinitely suspended. A lawyer on disability inactive status
may apply for reinstatement only after one year has passed from
the date of the court's order, and thereafter only once each
year. 170 The Rule on Disciplinary Procedure provides that rein-
statement may be granted only "upon a showing by clear and
convincing evidence that the attorney's disability has been re-
moved and he is fit to resume the practice of law.' ' 7 1 Any disci-
plinary proceedings pending at the time of the disability inactive
status order are reactivited when the court grants the reinstate-
167. See In re Easler, 275 S.C. 400, 272 S.E.2d 32 (1980).
168. S.C. Sup. CT. R. Disc. P. § 6E (Supp. 1984).
169. Id. § 7B.
170. Id. § 19F. Section 19F states that the lawyer "shall be allowed to petition for
reinstatement to active status once a year." Id. Interpreted literally, this section would
allow a lawyer on disability inactive status to apply for reinstatement at any time during
the first year following the supreme court's order and, thereafter, to apply annually on
the anniversary of the first petition for reinstatement. But see In re Dawes, 267 S.C. 597,
230 S.E.2d 446 (1976) (reinstatement petition cannot be filed earlier than one year from
order of indefinite suspension arising from physical illness and alcoholism). The court
decided Dawes prior to the promulgation of Rule 19.
171. S.C. Sup. CT. R. Disc. P. § 19F (Supp. 1984). A reinstatement petition must
contain a list of all physicians and other persons who have treated the lawyer and all
institutions in which the lawyer has been treated while on disability inactive status. Id. §
19H. The supreme court may also require the lawyer to undergo a medical examination
by a doctor designated by the court. Id. § 19F.
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ment petition. 17 2
A lawyer who has been indefinitely suspended may not ap-
ply for reinstatement for two years after the entry of the suspen-
sion order.17 3 If the court denies such a petition, the lawyer may
not file a new petition for two additional years. 17 4 The lawyer
must supply certain background information, must take and
pass the bar examination, and must establish "by clear and con-
vincing proof that he has rehabilitated himself.'1 75 To date, the
court has reinstated only three indefinitely suspended lawyers.
1 6
The most recent reinstatement occurred in 1973.
A lawyer temporarily suspended for a period not exceeding
two years pursuant to the amendment to the Rule on Discipli-
nary Procedure that the supreme court adopted October 17,
1984,177 may petition for reinstatement at any time.17  All the
requirements that apply to the reinstatement of an indefinitely
suspended lawyer 179 apply to the reinstatement of a temporarily
suspended lawyer, except retaking and passing the bar
examination.
d. Multiple Sanctions
One final important feature of the Supreme Court Rule on
Disciplinary Procedure is the effect of multiple sanctions. The
court may impose a permanent disbarment when a lawyer who
was reinstated following an indefinite suspension is subsequently
found guilty of any ethical misconduct.180 Prior to the amend-
ment adopted by the supreme court on October 17, 1984, the
Rule required that when a lawyer who had received two private
172. Id. §§ 19B, 19C.
173. Id. § 37. Such a petition is referred to the Committee on Character and Fitness
rather than to the Board of Commissioners on Grievances and Discipline. Id. § 39.
174. Id. § 37.
175. Id. § 38A. The supreme court may place conditions on the lawyer's practice as
part of the reinstatement order. Id. § 38B.
176. See In re Anderson, 260 S.C. 186, 194 S.E.2d 888 (1973); In re Jacobson, 254
S.C. 270, 175 S.E.2d 226 (1970); In re Lempesis, 254 S.C. 284, 175 S.E.2d 234 (1970).
177. See Davis Advance Sheets No. 51, Oct. 27, 1984.
178. S.C. Sup. CT. R. Disc. P. § 37 (Supp. 1984)(as amended, October 17, 1984). See
also id. § 8D (as amended, October 17, 1984). Apparently, a temporarily suspended law-
yer will not be reinstated automatically at the termination of the designated suspension
period. In other words, reinstatement is discretionary with the supreme court.
179. S.C. Sup. CT. R. Disc. P. §§ 37, 38A (Supp. 1984).
180. Id. § 8B.
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reprimands was subsequently found guilty of another ethical vi-
olation, a public reprimand was the minimum sanction that
could be imposed. The Rule further provided that an indefinite
suspension was the minimum sanction the court could impose on
a lawyer who had received a public reprimand and then comit-
ted a subsequent violation. The October 1984 amendment re-
placed the minimum penalty rule for subsequent violation cases,
except for cases involving lawyers previously indefinitely sus-
pended, with a provision allowing the supreme court to set the
sanction at its discretion.' 8 ' The amendment gives the court
flexibility to impose an appropriate sanction rather than being
locked into a rigid standard.'82
4. Strategic Suggestions for Defending Against a Grievance
Most lawyers are understandably shocked, hurt, and proba-
bly angry when they receive notice that a grievance has been
filed against them. A lawyer in this situation may conclude that
the grievance is completely baseless and that it is not necessary,
therefore, to reply to the notice letter from the Board of Com-
missioners on Grievances and Discipline. However, refusing to
cooperate in the investigation makes matters worse. Such an at-
titude certainly arouses the suspicion of the Board and of any
investigator assigned to the grievance, and may provoke an in-
vestigation that is much more rigorous than it might otherwise
have been. Moreover, under the Supreme Court Rule on Disci-
plinary Procedure, failure to file an answer to a formal com-
plaint is treated as an admission of all charges. Therefore, the
only issue left for consideration at the hearing and on appeal is
the appropriate sanction. 3 Furthermore, failure to cooperate it-
self constitutes misconduct justifying a disciplinary sanction,
181. Id. § 8C.
182. The minimum penalty standard was applied in seven cases. Each case con-
cerned a prior public reprimand. In five cases, the lawyer was disbarred. See In re Davis,
279 S.C. 433, 309 S.E.2d 5 (1983); In re Burgess, 279 S.C. 44, 302 S.E.2d 325 (1983); In re
Kitts, 278 S.C. 279, 294 S.E.2d 786 (1982); In re Clay, 268 S.C. 409, 234 S.E.2d 229
(1977); In re Burr, 267 S.C. 419, 228 S.E.2d 678 (1976). In the other two cases, a sanction
of indefinite suspension was imposed. See In re Moore, 280 S.C. 178, 312 S.E.2d 1 (1984);
In re Craig, 272 S.C. 197, 249 S.E.2d 915 (1978). See also In re Lake, 269 S.C. 170, 236
S.E.2d 812 (1977)(disbarment of lawyer who had previously received a private
reprimand).
183. See supra notes 113-14 and accompanying text.
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and is an aggravating factor that the supreme court has often
considered in determining the severity of the sanction."' In
1982, the court expressed its views on this issue in In re
Treacy.'85 The respondent in Treacy was charged with neglect-
ing a case for which he had been paid a $500 fee. 86 The respon-
dent failed to answer inquiries from the Board, failed to file re-
quested documents, and failed to attend scheduled hearings.1 87
Although the hearing panel and the Board recommended a pub-
lic reprimand, the supreme court indefinitely suspended the re-
spondent and ordered him to repay the $500 fee under penalty
of contempt. Commenting on the respondent's refusal to cooper-
ate, the court stated:
The Respondent was granted the right to practice law in South
Carolina by the Supreme Court. Both the Hearing Panel and
the Executive Committee, as well as the Commission itself
serve as arms of this Court. Failure to respond to any of these
is the equivalent of a refusal to respond to the Supreme Court.
We look with disdain upon the attitude of the Respondent to-
wards those who were charged with the duty of investigating
the Complaint of Mr. Jackle. His lack of respect for consti-
tuted authority is consistent with his lack of understanding of
his duty to his client. His action and lack of action in dealing
with the Board of Commissioners is clearly misconduct un-
becoming an attorney and is reason for sanction.' 8
Because most grievances involve attorney-client contract
disputes and not serious ethics violations that warrant discipli-
nary sanction,8 9 a full explanation of the facts and an expres-
sion of willingness to take corrective action may convince the
chairman or the Executive Committee that no probable cause
for a complaint exists. Often a telephone call or a letter from the
respondent to the complainant, an offer to return a file, or an
offer to repay all or part of a fee will satisfactorily resolve the
matter. In this connection, although not part of his official du-
ties, the chairman frequently acts as an intermediary in resolv-
184. See, e.g., In re Sifly, 279 S.C. 113, 302 S.E.2d 858 (1983); In re Kitts, 276 S.C.
242, 277 S.E.2d 602 (1981); In re Crosland, 270 S.C. 546, 243 S.E.2d 198 (1978).
185. 277 S.C. 514, 290 S.E.2d 240 (1982).
186. Id. at 515, 290 S.E.2d at 240.
187. Id. at 516-17, 290 S.E.2d at 241.
188. Id. at 517-18, 290 S.E.2d at 241-42.
189. See supra notes 78-87 and accompanying text.
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When a grievance alleges misconduct which warrants disci-
plinary sanction, an agreeable settlement with the complainant
does not terminate the disciplinary proceeding, even if the com-
plainant withdraws the grievance.191 Nevertheless, the respon-
dent's willingness to cooperate in the investigation, an offer of
restitution, and a promise to take other corrective action are
mitigating factors considered in determining the sanction.9 2-
In addition to adopting a cooperative attitude, a lawyer in a
grievance situation should take other important steps. First, the
lawyer should review the Supreme Court Rule on Disciplinary
Procedure and significant disciplinary decisions involving similar
facts. Second, the lawyer should analyze the charges made in the
grievance realistically. It is extremely important to comply with
the strict time deadlines and other procedural requirements in
the Rule 9 3 when preparing a defense, and it is critical that a
lawyer realize that there is no statute of limitations applicable to
a grievance, absent some actual prejudice from the lapse of
time.19 4 Furthermore, neither restitution, compromise with a
complainant, the complainant's refusal to prosecute,9 5 nor
pending litigation arising from the same facts warrants dismissal
or abeyance of a disciplinary proceeding. 96
190. Informal attempts at mediation by disciplinary agencies are a common prac-
tice. See Steele & Nimmer, supra note 2, at 985-86.
191. See S.C. Sup. CT. R. Disc. P. § 35 (Supp. 1984).
192. See In re Burr, 265 S.C. 84, 217 S.E.2d 143 (1975).
193. See supra notes 109-116 and accompanying text.
194. State v. Jennings, 161 S.C. 263, 159 S.E.2d 627 (1931). This is also the rule in
most other states. See, e.g., In re Bosson, 60 Ill. 2d 439, 328 N.E.2d 309 (1975); Annot.,
93 A.L.R.3d 1057 (1979)(remoteness in time may be a mitigating factor in determining
the appropriate sanction). But see In re Vaught, 268 S.C. 530, 235 S.E.2d 115 (1977)(de-
lay in processing charges against attorney prompted court to elect a less stringent disci-
plinary standard).
195. See S.C. Sup. CT. R. Disc. P. § 35 (Supp. 1984). See also In re Galloway, 278
S.C. 615, 300 S.E.2d 479 (1983)(disbarment ordered despite full restitution). Unlike a
malpractice action, a disciplinary sanction may be imposed even when a client has suf-
fered no monetary damage. See In re Davis, 276 S.C. 532, 280 S.E.2d 644 (1981). Simi-
larly, when fraudulent activity is the basis of the discipline, the respondent need not be
criminally convicted before a disciplinary sanction is imposed. See Cate v. Rivers, 246
S.C. 35, 142 S.E.2d 369 (1965).
196. See S.C. Sup. CT. R. Disc. P. § 34 (Supp. 1984). A disciplinary proceeding will
be held in abeyance during the appeal of a conviction of a serious crime. Id. § 6C. A
proceeding is also held in abeyance during the time a lawyer is on disability inactive
status. Id. § 19C.
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It is quite difficult for a lawyer in a grievance proceeding to
remain objective because of the mental anguish inherent in the
process. A lawyer should discuss the charges with another lawyer
before responding to the Board's grievance notice. If the charges
appear meritorious, a lawyer should retain another lawyer to re-
present him or her in the disciplinary proceeding. A lawyer
should certainly retain counsel if a formal complaint is filed. Re-
tained counsel may prevent a respondent from making over-
broad, damaging admissions. More importantly, retained counsel
is probably able to present the respondent's defense more effec-
tively than could the respondent.
Retained counsel is particularly valuable when a respondent
must admit he or she has a serious alcohol, drug, or mental
problem that is the cause of the grievance, and must accept disa-
bility inactive status while seeking treatment.197 If the therapy is
effective and the respondent is reinstated, the disciplinary pro-
ceeding is reactivated.9 " Nevertheless, the Board and the su-
preme court will certainly consider the fact that the disability
has been overcome. 9
When a sanction is likely to result from a grievance, the
ability to confront this fact early in the proceeding may diminish
a respondent's emotional trauma. Accepting the fact that some
sanction will result may allow a respondent to obtain a less se-
vere sanction than might otherwise be given. For example, the
respondent may tender a conditional admission and consent to
discipline;200 the earlier the consent offer, the better a respon-
dent's chance of receiving a private or public reprimand instead
of a more severe public sanction. Once misconduct has been
found at a formal hearing, it is not likely the supreme court will
197. Disability inactive status is technically not a disciplinary sanction under the
Supreme Court Rule on Disciplinary Procedure. Compare id. §§ 7, 8 with id. § 19. For
this reason, disability inactive status does not carry the same stigma as a public sanction.
Prior to adoption of § 19 as part of the Rule on Disciplinary Procedure in 1978, the
supreme court generally indefinitely suspended lawyers with serious mental or physical
illnesses. See In re Howey, 267 S.C. 430, 229 S.E.2d 264 (1976); In re Chipley, 254 S.C.
588, 176 S.E.2d 412, cert. denied, 401 U.S. 1010 (1970).
198. See S.C. Sup. CT. R. Disc. P. § 19 (Supp. 1984).
199. Emotional or physical illness is not a defense to a disciplinary action, but may
be a mitigating factor. See, e.g., In re Glickman, 271 S.C. 167, 246 S.E.2d 174 (1978); In
re Wooten, 260 S.C. 12, 193 S.E.2d 808 (1973); but cf. Annot., 26 A.L.R.4th 995 (1983).
200. See S.C. Sup. CT. R. Disc. P. § 28 (Supp. 1984). See also supra notes 153-56,
376-78 and accompanying text.
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approve consent for a sanction less severe than that recom-
mended by the hearing panel.
The same considerations are present when the respondent's
only alternatives to a published disbarment order are resignation
or disbarment by consent. The earlier in the proceeding the res-
ignation request is filed, the more likely the court will accept
it.2 01 If the court turns down a tendered resignation, as it has
done frequently,20 2 the respondent may avoid the public disclos-
ure of the underlying facts by consenting to disbarment.2 3 A
resignation in this situation is preferable because a lawyer may
then publicly maintain that he or she has never been disbarred.
A forceful presentation of mitigating factors and an analysis
of similar cases in which the court has approved a sanction ac-
ceptable to the respondent are important in any case in which
there is proof of misconduct warranting a sanction.20 4 Retained
counsel is much more likely to make an effective impression on
the hearing panel than is an emotionally distraught respondent.
B. Sanction Cases from January 1970 Through June 1984
Table 3 shows the breakdown of the 123 sanction opinions
in which the South Carolina Supreme Court specified the type
of misconduct, and the 60 private reprimands the Board of
Commissioners on Grievances and Discipline imposed during the
same period, classified according to the disciplinary rules in the
Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR).0 Table 3 also shows
201. See In re Garris, 279 S.C. 460, 309 S.E.2d 755 (1983)(lawyer's resignation ten-
dered after argument before the supreme court but before opinion issued held to be
untimely).
202. See, e.g., In re Garris, 279 S.C. 460, 309 S.E.2d 755 (1983); In re Bonnette, 278
S.C. 452, 298 S.E.2d 215 (1982). Through June 1984, the South Carolina Supreme Court
accepted 13 resignations and rejected 8 tendered resignations from lawyers who were
under investigation for ethical misconduct.
203. See S.C. Sup. CT. R. Disc. P. § 27C (Supp. 1984). See also In re Harvey, 278
S.C. 101, 292 S.E.2d 595 (1982).
204. See generally Nordby, supra note 98, at 417-51. There are numerous annota-
tions analyzing cases of various types of misconduct. See, e.g., Annot., 11 A.L.R.4th 133
(1982) (excessive fees); Annot., 36 A.L.R.3d 735 (1971)(sexual misconduct).
205. S.C. Sup. CT. R. 32 (Supp. 1984). The definition of misconduct in § 5 of the
Supreme Court Rule on Disciplinary Procedure includes violations of the attorney's oath
of office, conviction of a serious crime, incompetence, and conduct tending to pollute the
administration of justice, as well as violations of the Model Code of Professional Respon-
sibility. All of these forms of misconduct are encompassed in the Code's disciplinary
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the percentage of cases in which a particular category of offense
was present. For example, trust fund and related violations
under DR 9-102 of the CPR were a significant element in fifty-
two, or twenty-eight percent, of the 183 cases in the analysis.
The total of the percentage figures in Table 3 exceeds 100% be-
cause many cases involved more than one major type of
misconduct.
Misconduct
DR 1-102(A)(3-6) N = 57 31%
Advertising and Solicitation N = 9%
DR 2-101 to 2-105
Legal Fees 5%
DR 2-106, 2-107, 3.102(A)
Conflicts of Interest N - 31 17%
DR 5.101 to 5-107, 9-101(B)
Neglect and Incompetence N = 43 I 24%
DR 6-101
Overzealous Representation N = 45 25%
DR 7-101 to 7-110
Trust Accounts N - 52 28%
DR 9-102
All Other N-9 5%
S I I 1I I I
10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80
Number of Sanctions
TABLE 3
Sanctions Categorized by CPR Disciplinary Rules
January 1970 Through June 1984
Table 4 shows the type of sanctions imposed in the 183
cases that were used in compiling Table 3. Table 4 indicates that
disbarment or indefinite suspension, for which few reinstate-
ments have been authorized,2 °6 was ordered in forty percent of
the cases, and that a public or private reprimand was ordered in
sixty percent of the cases. The number of disbarments may be
understated because four disbarments by consent and thirteen
resignations under investigation for misconduct are excluded
rules.
206. See supra note 176 and accompanying text.
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from Tables 3 and 4 and from the other tables in this section
because the court did not indicate the nature of the misconduct
in the published opinions.20 7 Including these seventeen addi-
tional cases increases the percentage of disbarments from
twenty-five percent to thirty-one percent and increases the per-
centage of disbarments and indefinite suspensions from forty










Type of Sanctions All Cases
January 1970 Through June 1984
Because the statistical data on disciplinary sanctions in
other states vary greatly, it is not possible to compare the data
in Tables 3 and 4 with data from other jurisdictions in any
meaningful manner. The available statistics indicate that the
breakdown of the cases in South Carolina does not differ signifi-
cantly from that in other states, with two possible exceptions.
First, the percentage of sanction cases involving neglect appears
to be higher in South Carolina than in most states. 0 8 Because
there is no evidence that South Carolina lawyers are more prone
to neglect than are lawyers in other states, the most logical ex-
planation for this difference is the greater willingness of the
207. See S.C. Sup. CT. R. Disc. P. § 27 (Supp. 1984).
208. According to the study conducted by Steele and Nimmer published in 1976, the
percentage of sanctions for neglect in seven of the largest jurisdictions was as follows:
California, 16.9%; Florida, 24.0%; Michigan, 48.4%; New York City, 14.4%; New York
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South Carolina Supreme Court to impose disciplinary sanctions
for violations of DR 6-101(A)(3). Whatever the reason, the su-
preme court has made it clear that persistent neglect, as distin-
guished from mere isolated acts of negligence, warrants discipli-
nary sanction.20 9 A second distinctive feature of the South
Carolina disciplinary sanction cases since 1969 is the percentage
of disbarments. For example, based on 1983 nationwide data
compiled by the ABA National Discipline Data Bank, the per-
centage of disbarments to other forms of public discipline was
twenty-four percent.210 In South Carolina the equivalent disbar-
ment percentage for 1983 was forty-seven percent.21' Moreover,
the range of sanctions in South Carolina is not as great as in
most other states. Several suggestions for changes in the sanc-
tions authorized by the Supreme Court Rule on Disciplinary
Procedure are discussed in Part IV of this Article.212
Table 5 shows the number of years a lawyer has been admit-
ted to practice at the time of a public disciplinary sanction. The
Table does not include private reprimands because the identity
of the respondent is confidential. The most surprising finding
from Table 5 is that lawyers admitted to practice for ten years
or less received only thirty-nine percent of public sanctions from
January 1970 through July 1984.213 This statistic is somewhat
surprising because of the tremendous increase in the number of
lawyers in South Carolina in recent years: from the beginning of
1974 through the end of 1983, the number of lawyers increased
209. See infra notes 275-83 and accompanying text.
210. ABA STANDING COMM. ON PROF. DISc. AND CENTER FOR PROF. RESP., STATISTI-
CAL REPORT RE: PUBLIC DISCIPLINE OF LAWYERS BY DISCIPLINARY AGENCIES, 1979-1983,
Chart II (Part I) at 70 (1984). Only disbarments, suspensions and public reprimands are
included in the calculations reported in the text. In 1982, the disbarment rate was 33%.
Id. This increase resulted for the most part from the doubling of the number of consent
disbarments between 1982 and 1983. In 1981, the national disbarment rate was 28%. Id.
211. See Table 1. The equivalent disbarment percentage for South Carolina cases
was 38% in 1982 and 33% in 1981. Id.
212. See infra notes 379-95 and accompanying text.
213. The only other published data relating disciplinary sanctions to years admitted
to practice is from California where a survey of disciplinary cases from 1972-1973 re-
vealed that 64% of the sanctions were imposed on lawyers admitted to practice 10 years
or less. Hufstedler, President's Message: Another Look at Discipline, 49 CAL. ST. L.J.
224 (1974). The author of the article reporting the survey stated that the results were not
surprising because over 60% of the California bar had been admitted to practice for less
then 10 years. Id. at 226.
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from 2,904 to 5,385, an eighty-five percent increase. 14 To test
the impact of this increase on the distribution of sanctions based
on years of practice, the South Carolina public discipline cases
in the five year period from 1974-1978 and in the succeeding five
year period from 1978-1983 were analyzed. Comparing the two
Number of Attorneys
Publicly Disciplined


















Years Admitted to Practice at Time of
Disciplinary Sanction
January 1970 Through June 1984
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periods reveals that the percentage of cases in which sanctions
were imposed upon lawyers in practice for ten years or less in-
creased from thirty-seven percent to forty-three percent. This
increase is less than the increase in the number of lawyers dur-
ing the same period.
The data in Table 5 indicates that lawyers in practice six to
ten years at the time of a sanction are more vulnerable to disci-
plinary sanctions than those in any other category. Because one
or two years elapse between the time a grievance is filed and the
time a sanction order is issued, the most vulnerable period is
apparently from four to eight years after a lawyer is admitted to
practice.
Tables 6 and 7 compare public sanctions against all lawyers
with public sanctions against lawyers admitted to practice ten
years or less during the period January 1970 through June 1984.
Although the disbarment rate for lawyers admitted to practice
ten years or less is higher than that for all lawyers (forty-seven
percent versus thirty-six percent), the difference between the
two groups is reduced considerably by including indefinite sus-
pensions, which historically have the same effect as disbarments,
in the comparison (sixty-three percent versus fifty-nine percent).
Thus, 'these tables indicate that the pattern of public sanctions
against lawyers admitted to practice ten years or less is not sig-
nificantly different from the overall pattern of public sanctions.
Table 8 relates the five most numerous categories of ethical
violations to the number of years in practice at the time of a
disciplinary sanction. One of the most interesting observations
derived from this table is the similarity between the relative per-
centages of CPR violations in the sanction cases involving law-
yers admitted to practice six to ten years and those admitted to
practice twenty-one to twenty-five years. The other general con-
clusions that can be drawn from Table 8 are: (1) that trust ac-
count violations are among the most prevalent type of ethical
violation in every age category and; (2) that, on a comparative
basis, neglect and conflict of interest violations are less prevalent
for lawyers admitted to practice fifteen years or less compared to
lawyers admitted to practice more than fifteen years at the time
a public disciplinary sanction is imposed.
[Vol. 36
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Public Sanctions of All Lawyers
January 1970 Through June 1984
TABLE 7
Lawyers Admitted to the Bar 0-10 Years When Sanctions Applied
January 1970 Through June 1984
The remaining material in this section examines more
closely the disciplinary sanction cases in terms of each category
of misconduct represented in Table 3.
19851
45
Haynsworth: Disciplinary Actions by the South Carolina Supreme Court and the
Published by Scholar Commons,








0-5 Years 6-10 Years 11-15 Years 16-20 Years 21-25 Years 26-50 Years
Years in Practice
TABLE 8
Years in Practice at the Time of Disciplinary Sanction Related
to CPR Violations
January 1970 Through June 1984
1. DR 1-102(A) Misconduct
The key provisions in DR 1-102(A) 215 for purposes of this
Article are subsections (3)-(6) which state that a lawyer shall
not:
(3) Engage in illegal conduct involving moral turpitude.
215. DR 1-102(A)(1) and (2) are violated whenever a lawyer is guilty of violating any
disciplinary rule or causing someone else to violate a disciplinary rule. Therefore DR 1-
102(A)(1) and (2) are technically applicable to every disciplinary sanction case. The prin-
cipal thrust of DR 1-102(A)(3-6), on the other hand, is on activities which adversely
reflect on a lawyer's fitness to practice law but which do not clearly fall under one of the
other disciplinary rules in the Code of Professional Responsibility.
[Vol. 36
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(4) Engage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or
misrepresentation.
(5) Engage in conduct that is prejudical to the administration
of justice.
(6) Engage in any other conduct that adversely reflects on his
fitness to practice law.21
The most significant feature of DR 1-102(A)(3-6) is the fact that
it is not limited to misconduct related to the practice of law.211
In fact, twenty-two of the fifty-seven cases concerning DR 1-
102(A)(3-6) violations were cases in which sanctions were im-
posed following convictions of crimes. Moreover, in several other
cases, evidence of improper behavior unrelated to the respon-
dent's law practice, including resisting arrest and disorderly con-
duct, had an impact on the sanction ultimately imposed.21 s
Table 9 shows a breakdown of the DR 1-102(A)(3-6) cases
by form of disciplinary sanction. A comparison of this data to
that displayed in Table 4, which gives a breakdown of the sanc-
tions in all cases, indicates that the percentage of disbarments is
significantly higher and that the number of private reprimands
is significantly lower in the DR 1-102(A)(3-6) cases. These differ-
ences are due in large measure to the sanction pattern in cases
in which discipline is imposed following conviction of serious
crimes.
As Table 10 indicates, the supreme court has ordered dis-
barment in fifty-five percent of the serious crime cases and in-
definite suspension in twenty-three percent of these cases. In
other words, in almost four out of every five serious crime cases,
the respondent has been disbarred or indefinitely suspended.
The South Carolina Supreme Court has been particularly
strict in cases concerning convictions for possession and distri-
216. S.C. Sup. CT. R. 32, DR 1-102(A)(Supp. 1984).
217. This is the general rule throughout the United States. See, e.g., Maryland State
Bar v. Agnew, 271 Md. 543, 318 A.2d 811 (1974). See also S.C. Sup. CT. R. Disc. P. § 5B
(Supp. 1984).
218. See, e.g., In re Sampson, 259 S.C. 471, 192 S.E.2d 859 (1972)(resisting arrest
and disorderly conduct considered by the court in imposing an indefinite suspension).
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Sanctions in DR 1-102(A)(3-6) Cases
TABLE 10
Sanctions Following Conviction of a Serious Crime
bution of illegal drugs,"" fraud,220 obstruction of justice,22' and
219. See, e.g., In re Ramsey, 279 S.C. 29, 301 S.E.2d 470 (1983) (disbarment ordered
when lawyer was found guilty of conspiracy to distribute marijuana and cocaine and of
distributing cocaine). In 1975, the Board of Commissioners on Grievances and Discipline
imposed a private reprimand against a lawyer who had pleaded guilty to possession of
marijuana. See 1975 BD, ComI'Rs GRIEv. & Disc. ANNuAL REP. Possession of marijuana
has always been regarded as a less serious crime than distribution. Additionally, until
1978, the supreme court did not review private reprimands. See supra note 137 and ac-
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contempt.222 The court's treatment of failure to file income tax
returns cases may be changing, however.223 In 1974, the court
indefinitely suspended a lawyer for pleading guilty to five counts
of failure to file tax returns. 24 In 1975, the court indefinitely
suspended 225 one lawyer and disbarred another 226 following nolo
contendere pleas to failing to file tax returns. In 1983, however,
the court imposed only a public reprimand following a guilty
plea for knowingly and willfully failing to file a federal income
tax return.227 Since the court did not discuss the prior cases in
the opinion, at this time it is not possible to predict whether the
court is adopting a new policy in tax cases.22 s
The DR 1-102(A)(3-6) cases that do not involve criminal
convictions are not particularly remarkable. Table 11 shows the
disciplinary sanctions that have been imposed in these cases.
The pattern of sanctions in Table 11 is closer to that in Table 4
than to the serious crime cases. Perhaps the most distinctive
feature in Table 11 is the wide variety of misconduct mentioned.
Included are cases of fraud,229 misrepresentation,23 0 check kiting
schemes,231 issuance of bad checks,232 dis6rderly conduct,233 and
companying text.
220. See, e.g., In re Bonnette, 278 S.C. 452, 298 S.E.2d 215 (1982)(tendered resigna-
tion rejected and disbarment ordered following conviction on 15 counts of fraudulently
obtaining money).
221. See, e.g., In re Van Winter, 273 S.C. 156, 255 S.E.2d 347 (1979)(disbarment).
222. See, e.g., In re Holman, 277 S.C. 293, 286 S.E.2d 148 (1982).
223. Willful failure to file income tax returns is specifically listed as a serious crime
in S.C. Sup. CT. R. Disc. P. § 20 (Supp. 1984).
224. In re Martin, 264 S.C. 1, 212 S.E.2d 251 (1974)(plea of guilty to five counts of
failure to file).
225. In re Ray, 264 S.C. 292, 214 S.E.2d 328 (1975).
226. In re Towles, 265 S.C. 556, 220 S.E.2d 646 (1975) (commingling and neglect
also alleged).
227. In re Gamble, 278 S.C. 651, 300 S.E.2d 737 (1983).
228. In 1975, the Board of Commissioners on Grievances and Discipline imposed a
private reprimand for failure to file a tax return. At that time, however, the supreme
court did not review private reprimands. See supra note 137 and accompanying text.
229. See, e.g., In re Boineau, 269 S.C. 189, 236 S.E.2d 821 (1977)(resignation ac-
cepted following revocation of real estate license).
230. See, e.g., In re Rothwell, 278 S.C. 391, 296 S.E.2d 870 (1982) (public reprimand
issued).
231. See In re Cauthen, 267 S.C. 448, 229 S.E.2d 340 (1976).
232. See, e.g., In re Hartzog, 257 S.C. 84, 184 S.E.2d 116 (1971).
233. See, e.g., In re Thomason, 279 S.C. 197, 304 S.E.2d 821 (1983)(drunken and
disorderly conduct). See also In re Norwood, 273 S.C. 780, 260 S.E.2d 177 (1979) (dis-
obeying court order prohibiting removal of property from former wife's house). Several
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failing to cooperate with Board investigations.234 Most of the
cases also involved violations of other provisions in the CPR.
N = 35
TABLE 11
Sanctions in Other DR 1-102(A)(3-6) Cases
2. Advertising and Solicitation
South Carolina lawyers have received four sanctions for im-
proper advertising and twelve sanctions for improper solicita-
tion. The distribution of the sanctions in these cases is shown in
Table 12. The most distinctive feature of the advertising and so-
licitation cases is the high percentage resulting in public repri-
mands and the low percentage resulting in disbarments and in-
definite suspensions when compared with the sanction
percentages of all cases shown in Table 4.
Actually, the contrast is more striking when the advertising
and solicitation disbarment cases are examined more closely. In
the single advertising case in which the court disbarred a law-
yer,235 the respondent was also guilty of numerous acts of neglect
and had previously received a public reprimand.3 6 Accordingly,
private reprimands have been issued for such conduct. See, e.g., 1979 BD. COMM'RS
GRIEV. & Disc. ANNUAL REP. (assault on a fellow lawyer during a trial recess).
234. See, e.g., In re Treacy, 277 S.C. 514, 290 S.E.2d 240 (1982).
235. In re Burgess, 279 S.C. 44, 302 S.E.2d 325 (1983).
236. See In re Burgess, 275 S.C. 315, 270 S.E.2d 436 (1980).
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Sanctions in Advertising and Solicitation Cases
the Supreme Court Rule on Disciplinary Procedure in effect at
the time the opinion was rendered mandated that indefinite sus-
pension was the minimum sanction the respondent could re-
237ceive. Furthermore, the court clearly indicated that the real
reason for the disbarment order was the respondent's pattern of
persistent neglect.23 8 Similarly, in one of the three solicitation
cases in which the court ordered disbarment, the respondent was
also guilty of several other acts of misconduct, including conver-
sion of client funds, which would have justified disbarment inde-
pendently of the solicitation charges. 23 9 A second solicitation dis-
barment case also involved other acts of misconduct.24 0 The
third solicitation disbarment case involved a reciprocal referral
scheme between a doctor and a lawyer and seven instances of
proven improper solicitation.24'
Three other cases illustrate the supreme court's apparent
reluctance to impose stiff sanctions for solicitation. In all three,
the court imposed a public reprimand although the Board of
Commissioners on Grievances and Discipline recommended
237. See supra notes 180-82 and accompanying text.
238. See 279 S.C. at 48, 302 S.E.2d at 327.
239. See In re Hartzog, 257 S.C. 84, 184 S.E.2d 116 (1971).
240. See In re Morris, 270 S.C. 308, 241 S.E.2d 911 (1978).
241. See In re Reaves, 272 S.C. 213, 214, 250 S.E.2d 329, 330 (1978).
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more severe sanctions.242 In one of these cases, the respondent
had been found guilty of two charges of solicitation. The dis-
senting opinion stated that these instances of solicitation were
part of an ongoing referral arrangement with an automobile re-
pair shop.24 3 The second case involved improper solicitation on
three occasions by an employee in the respondent's law office.244
In the third case, the respondent was guilty of solicitation in one
case and failure to promptly pay over settlement proceeds in an-
other case.245
3. Legal Fees
Legal fee disputes may result in the imposition of discipli-
nary sanctions for violation of three disciplinary rules in the
CPR. The first rule is DR 2-106, which prohibits excessive
fees.246 Eight sanction cases involved violations of DR 2-106.
The second rule is DR 2-107, which requires that a legal fee be
divided in proportion to the services and responsibilities per-
formed by each firm when more than one law firm is involved in
a case.247 Only one sanction case cites this provision.2 4 The third
rule is DR 3-102, which prohibits sharing legal fees with
nonlawyers.4 9 Only one sanction case directly involves this
provision.5 0
Table 13 shows the pattern of sanctions in legal fee cases. In
all of these cases, except one in which a private reprimand was
242. See infra notes 243-45. These three cases are particularly significant because
the supreme court, since 1969, has ordered a sanction less severe than that recommended
by the Board of Commissioners on Grievances and Discipline in only 7 cases, but has
increased the sanction recommended by the Board in 39 cases.
243. See In re Crosby, 256 S.C. 325, 327, 182 S.E.2d 289, 290 (1971).
244. See In re Craven, 267 S.C. 33, 225 S.E.2d 861 (1976). The court stated that it
did not follow the Board's recommendation primarily because Craven arose prior to the
court's published opinion in In re Bloom, 265 S.C. 86, 217 S.E.2d 143 (1975), which
warned that stiffer sanctions would be imposed in future solicitation cases.
245. See In re Houston, 271 S.C. 259, 247 S.E.2d 315 (1978).
246. S.C. Sup. CT. R. 32, DR 2-106 (Supp. 1984).
247. Id., DR 2-107.
248. In re Brown, 275 S.C. 180, 268 S.E.2d 284 (1980).
249. S.C. Sup. CT. R. 32, DR 3-102 (Supp. 1984).
250. In re Julian, 260 S.C. 48, 194 S.E.2d 195 (1973). In In re Craven, 267 S.C. 33,
225 S.E.2d 861 (1976), one of the respondent's employees had solicited clients. Although
this situation is usually present when DR 3-102 is invoked because the lawyer typically
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imposed,2 51 the impropriety concerning legal fees was one of sev-
eral ethical improprieties the respondent committed. In a major-
ity of cases the legal fee issue was a minor factor in the court's
ruling on the appropriate sanction.252 In other words, the sanc-
tion pattern would probably be quite different if fee violations








Sanctions Involving Legal Fees
The number of sanction cases involving legal fees is proba-
bly quite small compared to the total number of grievances
about legal fees received by the Board of Commissioners on
Grievances and Discipline.25" The vast majority of these fee
grievances are dismissed because the conduct involved does not
warrant a disciplinary sanction.254 Where a genuine dispute over
the amount of a legal fee exists, the Board routinely refers the
complainant to the South Carolina Bar Fee Disputes Board.255
Many of the meritorious grievances concerning legal fees filed
with the Board involve complaints about the failure of a lawyer
251. See 1975 BD. COMM'RS GRiEV. & Disc. ANNUAL REP.
252. Overcharging was clearly the principal violation in only two of the cases. See In
re James, 267 S.C. 474, 229 S.E.2d594 (1976); In re Sampson, 259 S.C. 471, 192 S.E.2d
859 (1972).
253. See supra notes 71-87 and accompanying text.
254. See supra note 87 and accompanying text.
255. For a more detailed description of the activities of the Fee Disputes Board, see
infra notes 412, 414 and accompanying text.
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to handle a legal matter in a timely manner. These cases are
discussed in the section concerning the sanction cases involving
neglect.256
4. Conflicts of Interest
Conflict of interest cases comprise seventeen percent of all
sanction cases decided by the South Carolina Supreme Court be-
tween January 1970 and July 1984.257 The distribution of sanc-
tions in these cases is shown in Table 14. The sanction pattern
for the conflict of interest cases does not differ significantly from








Sanctions Involving Conflicts of Interest
Violations of Code of Professional Responsibility Discipi-
nary Rule 5-104, concerning improper business transactions with
clients, have been a significant factor in twelve sanction cases.
The court ordered disbarment or indefinite suspension in fifty
percent of these cases. With one exception, the respondent in
each case was also found guilty of violating other disciplinary
rules.2 58 The exception is In re Rollins,259 a 1984 case in which a
256. See infra notes 275-83 and accompanying text. See also Table 15.
257. See Table 3.
258. See, e.g., In re Morris, 270 S.C. 308, 241 S.E.2d 911 (1978) (solicitation, charg-
ing an excessive fee, converting client security funds, engaging in an improper business
transaction with a client, and providing false testimony in an insurance claim).
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lawyer, who had been appointed general guardian of a minor,
was disbarred for investing $95,000 of the minor's funds in a
highly speculative close corporation that gave the lawyer a
$7,000 interest-free loan. The respondent in Rollins also bor-
rowed $5,000 from the minor's estate on a secured basis to facili-
tate the sale of a house the lawyer owned.260
Multiple Code of Professional Responsibility violations have
also been present in several cases resulting in public or private
reprimands. For example, in a 1977 case,261 the respondent pur-
chased real estate from an uneducated, unsophisticated couple
on an unsecured basis and later represented the wife in a claim
against the husband arising out of the original transaction. The
respondent subsequently obtained a liability release from the
wife after she had retained another lawyer.262 Both the hearing
panel and the Board of Commissioners on Grievances and Disci-
pline recommended a private reprimand. 263 The supreme court,
however, imposed a public reprimand and indicated that, but for
a delay of more than ten years in filing the grievance, it would
have imposed a more severe sanction.6 4
Eight cases have involved improper loans to clients in viola-
tion of DR 5-103(B), which states:
While representing a client in connection with contemplated or
pending litigation, a lawyer shall not advance or guarantee
financial assistance to his client, except that a lawyer may ad-
vance or guarantee the expenses of litigation, including court
costs, expenses of investigation, expenses of medical examina-
259. In re Rollins, 281 S.C. 467, 316 S.E.2d 670 (1984).
260. Id. at 468, 316 S.E.2d at 670.
261. In re Vaught, 268 S.C. 530, 235 S.E.2d 115 (1977).
262. Id. at 533-34, 235 S.E.2d at 116-17.
263. Id. at 531, 235 S.E.2d at 115.
264. Id. at 536, 235 S.E.2d at 118. A somewhat similar case with an unusual twist is
In re Pyatt, 280 S.C. 302, 312 S.E.2d 553 (1984). The respondent in Pyatt convinced
clients to transfer property on which a mortgage was about to be foreclosed to two indi-
viduals, one of whom was his wife. Id. at 303, 312 S.E.2d at 554. The property was later
conveyed to the respondents brother, who leased the property back to the respondents
clients. Id., 312 S.E.2d at 554. The respondent subsequently represented the brother in
an eviction action against the former clients. Id., 312 S.E.2d at 554. Although the Board
of Commissioners on Grievances and Discipline recommended indefinite suspension, the
supreme court ordered a public reprimand, which would automatically be increased to
indefinite suspension unless the property was reconveyed to the former clients within 30
days of the order. Id. at 304, 312 S.E.2d at 554. Pyatt is the first case in which the court
has ordered a respondent to return in specie property that is not in his or her possession.
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tion, and costs of obtaining and preserving evidence, provided
the client remains ultimately liable for such expenses." 5
Most of these cases involved loans to plaintiffs who had filed
personal injury actions. In its first opinion on this issue, the su-
preme court imposed a public reprimand but stated that it was
reluctant to impose any sanction for this misconduct because
very few other states did SO. 2 6 6 A number of subsequent cases
indicate that the court has overcome its original reluctance. In-
terestingly, however, the two most recent cases resulted in pri-
vate reprimands 267 whereas all prior cases resulted in some type
of public sanction.26 8
Violation of the DR 5-105269 restrictions on representation
of joint clients and suits against former clients has been an im-
portant factor in eight sanction cases.2 70 Additionally, in four
cases the respondents failed to follow the rule in DR 5-105(D)
27 1
which disqualifies all lawyers in a firm from representing a client
if one member of the law firm is disqualified. 2  Finally, DR 9-
101(B) was violated in four cases.2 7 3 This rule prohibits a lawyer
from accepting private employment in a matter in which he had
substantial responsibility while he or she was a public
employee.
2 7 4
265. S.C. Sup. CT. R. 32, DR 5-103(B)(Supp. 1984).
266. See In re Sandifer, 260 S.C. 633, 198 S.E.2d 120 (1973).
267. See 1982 BD. COMM'RS GRIEV. & Disc. ANNUAL REP.
268. The prior six cases resulted in three public reprimands, one indefinite suspen-
sion and two disbarments.
269. S.C. Sup. CT. R. 32, DR 5-105 (Supp. 1984).
270. See, e.g., In re Belser, 269 S.C. 682, 239 S.E.2d 492 (1977) (joint clients); In re
Vaught, 268 S.C. 530, 235 S.E.2d 115 (1977) (suit against former client). Disbarment was
ordered in one of the eight cases, public reprimand in four cases, and private reprimand
in three cases.
271. S.C. Sue. CT. R. 32, DR 5-105(D)(Supp. 1984).
272. See, e.g., In re McInnis, 273 S.C. 582, 258 S.E.2d 91 (1979) (law partner repre-
sented clients in traffic cases filed in court in which respondent was part-time judge).
The court ordered a public reprimand in McInnis and in one other DR 5-105(D) case.
Private reprimands were administered in the other two cases.
273. See, e.g., In re Jolly, 269 S.C. 668, 239 S.E.2d 490 (1977). Public reprimands
were issued in three of these cases and a private reprimand was administered in the
fourth.
274. S.C. Sup. CT. R. 32, DR 9-101(B)(Supp. 1984).
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DR 6-101(A) states that a lawyer shall not:
(1) Handle a legal matter which he knows or should know that
he is not competent to handle, without associating with him a
lawyer who is competent to handle it.
(2) Handle a legal matter without preparation adequate in the
circumstances.
(3) Neglect a legal matter entrusted to him.275
Although inadequate knowledge and preparation were factors in
seven sanction cases, 2 7 6 with one exception,277 all of these cases
also concerned neglect in violation of DR 6-101(A)(3).
In a majority of the neglect cases, the evidence indicated
that other disciplinary rules had been violated. For example, in
several neglect cases the respondent was also found guilty of
trust fund improprieties.278 This fact is significant because cli-
ents are not likely to report trust fund problems and other simi-
lar types of misconduct as grievances. Such misconduct is usu-
ally discovered during the course of an investigation following
the filing of the grievance charging some other ethical impropri-
ety such as neglect.
As previously mentioned, the number of sanction cases in
which neglect was a significant factor appears unusually high
when compared to the statistics available from other states.
There is no evidence, however, that the supreme court or the
Board of Commissioners on Grievances and Discipline has im-
posed disciplinary sanctions in cases involving isolated, simple
negligence as compared to neglect which involves behavior that
evidences indifference, conscious, disregard for the rights of cli-
ents, or consistent failure to handle cases in a professional man-
275. S.C. Sup. CT. R. 32, DR 6-101(A)(Supp. 1984).
276. Six of these cases concerned inadequate preparation in violation of DR 6-
101(A)(2).
277. See In re Christian, 267 S.C. 410, 228 S.E.2d 677 (1976) (failure to disclose a
mortgage).
278. See, e.g., In re Hines, 275 S.C. 271, 269 S.E.2d 766 (1980). Client security fund
violations were present in seven of the neglect cases. Ten other client security fund cases
involved failure to pay settlement proceeds in a timely manner. Although they may tech-
nically be viewed as neglect cases, this study includes payment of proceeds cases in the
grouping of client security fund cases.
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ner. 27 The court has indicated that imposition of a disciplinary
sanction for neglect does not prevent a complainant from pursu-
ing any other available remedy, even in cases in which a return
of all or part of the legal fee is ordered. 80 In addition, the court
has consistently held that, because the primary purpose of disci-
plinary sanctions is to protect the public, it is irrelevant to a
disciplinary proceeding whether a client suffers damages.2 81 In
other words, a lawyer may receive a disciplinary sanction for
neglect even in cases in which a complainant is unable to recover
for malpractice.
Table 15 shows the pattern of sanctions in neglect cases.
The percentage of each type of sanction roughly parallels those
in Table 4,282 which shows the sanction pattern for all cases used
in this analysis. Virtually all disbarment and indefinite suspen-
sion cases involve proof of other serious misconduct warranting
a sanction.283 In eleven of the forty-three neglect cases, the su-
preme court increased the sanction recommended by the Board
of Commissioners on Grievances and Discipline. Six of the in-
creased sanction cases were decided in the past three years.
These facts indicate the court's hard-line attitude toward lawyer
neglect.
279. See, e.g., In re Burgess, 279 S.C. 44, 48, 302 S.E.2d 325, 327 (1983)(lawyer who
had published misleading advertisements and had been found guilty of neglect was dis-
barred). The court stated:
Independent of the advertisements found to be inappropriate, the re-
peated failure of the respondent to perform his duty incident to the several
bankruptcy cases, forces the conclusion that this Court would not, at some fu-
ture date, be justified in reinstating this attorney. There is involved, not an
isolated incident but a pattern of activity inconsistent with the duty of this
Court to permit only qualified persons to hold themselves out to the public as
worthy of hire in the handling of legal matters.
Id. at 48, 302 S.E.2d at 327. Even in the cases in which the sanction was imposed for
neglect in handling one particular case, there was proof of multiple acts of neglect by the
attorney. See In re Mims, - S.C. -, 311 S.E.2d 926 (1984); In re Belser, 277 S.C. 250,
287 S.E.2d 139 (1982).
280. See S.C. Sup. CT. R. Disc. P. § 7A (Supp. 1984); In re Treacy, 277 S.C. 514, 290
S.E.2d 240 (1982).
281. See, e.g., In re Davis, 276 S.C. 532, 280 S.E.2d 644 (1981).
282. See Tables 4 and 15.
283. The one clear exception appears to be In re Kennedy, 254 S.C. 463, 176 S.E.2d
125 (1970). The court in Kennedy indefinitely suspended a lawyer who had failed to file
suit in two cases for which he collected a fee, even though the Board had recommended a
public reprimand. Id. at 464, 176 S.E.2d at 125. The court stated that the respondent's
poor attitude and sloppy office management justified the increase in the sanction. Id. at
464-65, 176 S.E.2d at 125-26.
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Canon 7 of the Code of Professional Responsibility requires
that a lawyer "represent a client zealously within the bounds of
the law. ' 284 The disciplinary rules in Canon 7 establish certain
minimum standards that a lawyer must observe while represent-
ing clients zealously. The disciplinary rules emphasize the
"within the bounds of the law" language in Canon 7. These rules
address a wide variety of issues including the filing of frivolous
complaints, perjury, and contacts with adverse parties, wit-
nesses, judges and jurors.
Although there are ten disciplinary rules in Canon 7, more
than sixty percent of the disciplinary sanction cases involving
Canon 7 violations fall within DR 7-102, which prohibits the
filing of frivolous claims or defenses, the knowing use of perjured
testimony, and active participation in other fraudulent activity
while representing clients. 85 At least six DR 7-102 cases in-
volved unnecessary or frivolous suits and defenses.288 In several
284. S.C. Sup. CT. R. 32, Canon 7 (Supp. 1984).
285. S.C. Sup. CT. R. 32, DR 7-102(A)(Supp. 1984).
286. See, e.g., In re James, 267 S.C. 474, 229 S.E.2d 594 (1976) (indefinite suspen-
sion); In re Edwards, 279 S.C. 89, 302 S.E.2d 339 (1983) (public reprimand for filing civil
and criminal actions against an individual who had filed a grievance). Suits in response
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cases, lawyers submitted false or forged documents, 28 7 knowingly
misrepresented facts, 8 suppressed evidence,2 89 or failed to take
prompt remedial action after discovering fraud or other error.290
Four sanction cases involve improper communications with
parties known to be represented by another lawyer, contrary to
DR 7-104,291 and three cases involve improper contacts with ju-
rors or members of their families, which is a violation of DR 7-
108.2 Additionally, in four cases, lawyers received private repri-
mands for settling cases without the client's consent or for fail-
ing to follow the client's instructions. 93
Canon 7 violations were present in twenty-five percent of
the sanction cases used in this 'analysis.294 As a unit, these cases
cast the bar in a bad light. Table 16 illustrates the supreme
court's attitude toward the various forms of misconduct involved
in these cases.295
to grievances are specifically forbidden by S.C. Sup. CT. R. Disc. P. §§ 20, 26 (Supp.
1984).
287. See, e.g., In re Wood, 279 S.C. 303, 306 S.E.2d 596(1983) (disbarment); In re
McGuinn, 272 S.C. 366, 252 S.E.2d 122 (1979) (public reprimand).
288. See, e.g., In re Rothwell, 278 S.C. 391, 296 S.E.2d 870 (1982) (public repri-
mand); In re Davis, 276 S.C. 532, 280 S.E.2d 644 (1981) (public reprimand).
289. See In re Barron, 278 S.C. 276, 294 S.E.2d 785 (1982) (public reprimand). See
also 1977 BD. COMM'Rs GRIEV. & Disc. ANNUAL REP. (report indicates a lawyer received a
private reprimand for trying to persuade an adverse witness not to testify, in violation of
DR 7-109(B)).
290. See In re Cauthen, 267 S.C. 448, 229 S.E.2d 340 (1976) (indefinite suspension).
See also 1979 BD. Comm'Rs GRIEV. & Disc. ANNUAL REP. (report states a private repri-
mand was administered in two cases concerning errors in briefs).
291. See, e.g., In re Sampson, 259 S.C. 471, 192 S.E.2d 859 (1972) (indefinite
suspension).
292. See In re Delgado, 279 S.C. 293, 306 S.E.2d 591 (1983) (public reprimand); In
re Two Anonymous Members of the South Carolina Bar, 278 S.C. 477, 298 S.E.2d 450
(1982) (private reprimand); In re Holman, 277 S.C. 293, 286 S.E.2d 148 (1982)
(disbarment).
293. See June 1969 - January 1974 BD. Comi'is GRIEV. & Disc. ANNUAL REP.; 1979
BD. COMM'RS GRIEV. & Disc. ANNUAL REP.
294. See Table 3. Many of the cases concerned violations of more than one Canon 7
disciplinary rule. For purposes of this analysis, these cases are counted only once.
295. There is no significant difference between the sanctions imposed in cases falling
under DR 7-102 and those cases falling under the other disciplinary rules in Canon 7.
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Sanctions Involving Canon 7
7. Trust Account Violations
DR 9-10226 concerns the preservation of a client's money
and other property. To comply with the rule, a lawyer must ful-
fill four requirements. First, a lawyer must deposit all client
funds in an account separate from his own.297 Unearned fees
must be deposited in the client trust account and may be with-
drawn only when earned. 298 The withdrawal of any funds, other
than earned fees, from a client security account constitutes con-
version unless the client consents to the withdrawal. Placing cli-
ent funds in an account that contains nonclient funds, or, alter-
natively, placing nonclient funds in a client trust account,
constitutes commingling. 29 Repayment of improperly withdrawn
funds does not prevent the imposition of a sanction.300 Restitu-
tion may, however, be considered by the Board or the court as a
296. S.C. Sup. CT. R. 32, DR 9-102 (Supp. 1984).
297. Id., DR 9-102(A).
298. Id., DR 9-102(A)(2). If the client disputes the lawyer's right to the fee, the
disputed amount cannot be withdrawn until the dispute is resolved.
299. See, e.g., In re Moore, 280 S.C. 178, 312 S.E.2d 1 (1984); In re Galloway, 278
S.C. 615, 300 S.E.2d 479 (1983).
300. See, e.g., In re Moore, 280 S.C. 178, 312 S.E.2d 1 (1984); In re Garris, 279 S.C.
460, 309 S.E.2d 755 (1983).
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mitigating factor in determining the appropriate sanction.30 A
second requirement is that all securities and other property be-
longing to a client must be deposited in a safe deposit box or
other safe place.30 2 Thirdly, a lawyer must maintain accurate
records showing all receipts and disbursements from any client
trust fund and the receipt and withdrawal of any other property
belonging to the client in the possession of the lawyer. 303 Finally,
except as otherwise authorized by law, a lawyer must promptly
pay or deliver all funds or other property belonging to a client to
that client at his or her request.
304
These four responsibilities are reasonably clear and, pre-
sumably, known by every lawyer. Even so, violations of these
rules constitute one of the most prevalent types of misconduct
for which sanctions are imposed. Since 1969, trust fund viola-
tions have been a major factor in 52 of the 183 South Carolina
sanction cases. 305 As might be expected, commingling and im-
proper withdrawals from client security accounts are the most
prevalent violations of DR 9-102.30 Additionally, failure to
promptly pay client security funds after settlement, at the direc-
tion of the client, or to promptly deliver other property to a cli-
ent has been present in thirty-three percent of the client secur-
ity fund cases.
307
A majority of DR 9-102 cases involve the violation of more
than one provision of DR 9-102 or of the other disciplinary
rules.30 In many of these multiple violation cases, the failure to
promptly disburse funds or to return property was probably the
basis of the grievance which led to the discovery of the other
misconduct. A client may know that he has not received his por-
tion of a settlement, but he may not be aware that the reason for
301. See, e.g., In re Mason, 271 S.C. 111, 245 S.E.2d 424 (1978); In re Burr, 265 S.C.
84, 217 S.E.2d 143 (1975).
302. S.C. Sup. CT. R. 32, DR 9-102(B)(1), (B)(2)(Supp. 1984).
303. Id., DR 9-102(B)(3).
304. Id., DR 9-102(B)(4).
305. See Table 3.
306. Such misconduct was present in at least 35 of the 52 trust fund cases.
307. See, e.g., In re King, 279 S.C. 48, 301 S.E.2d 752 (1983); In re Boensch, 277
S.C. 148, 283 S.E.2d 442 (1981).
308. See, e.g., In re Drose, 275 S.C. 414, 272 S.E.2d 173 (1980) (commingling, incom-
plete records, use of client security funds for payment of personal debts, and failure to
promptly disburse settlement funds); In re Bishop, 272 S.C. 306, 251 S.E.2d 748 (1979)
(various trust fund violations, neglect, and improper loans to clients).
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the delay is that his lawyer has misappropriated the settlement
proceeds.309
A comparison of Table 17 and Table 4310 indicates that the
South Carolina Supreme Court has dealt harshly with DR 9-102
violations. Sixty-five percent of the DR 9-102 violations resulted
in disbarments and indefinite suspensions while only forty per-
cent of all other sanction cases used in this analysis resulted in
those same penalties.. 11 Moreover, the court has increased the
sanction recommended by the Board of Commissioners on
Grievances and Discipline in twenty-one percent of the DR 9-
102 cases.3 12 Additionally, the number of private reprimands for




Sanctions Involving Trust Account Violations
309. When a check from a lawyer is returned for insufficient funds, the filing of a
grievance creates another situation in which the facts reported in the grievance may be
merely the tip of the iceberg.
310. See Tables 4 & 17.
311. Many of the resignations and disbarments by consent for trust account viola-
tions are excluded from this analysis because the supreme court's opinions do not dis-
close the reasons for discipline. Frequently, this omission may be determined from a
published order of temporary suspension. If these cases were included, the overall per-
centage of disbarments and indefinite suspensions in trust fund cases would be signifi-
cantly higher.
312. See, e.g., In re Julian, 260 S.C. 48, 194 S.E.2d 195 (1973) (increase from a pub-
lic reprimand to indefinite suspension).
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In summary, based on the existing cases, the chances are greater
than fifty percent that a lawyer found guilty of a trust fund vio-
lation will either be disbarred or indefinitely suspended, but
there is only one chance in ten that he or she will receive only a
private reprimand.
8. Remaining Sanctions
Nine sanction cases do not fall under any of the categories
previously discussed. Two of these cases involve false statements
in applications for admission to the bar in violation of DR 1-
101(A).3 In one of these cases the respondent was disbarred, 14
and in the second, the lawyer received a private reprimand. 15
Disciplinary Rule 2-110,316 regulating withdrawal from represen-
tation, was a factor in four sanction cases. In two cases, the law-
yer involved refused to follow through with an appeal and also
failed to file a motion requesting permission to withdraw. 17 In
another case, the respondent undertook representation of a cli-
ent who was already represented by another lawyer before that
lawyer had the opportunity to file a motion to withdraw.3 18 In
the fourth case, a private reprimand was administered to a law-
yer who threatened to withdraw from employment unless his
contingency fee was increased. 9
The only sanction concerning Canon 4, which requires a
lawyer to preserve the confidences and secrets of a client, is a
313. S.C. Sup. CT. R. 32, DR 1-101(A)(Supp. 1984).
314. In re Elliott, 268 S.C. 522, 235 S.E.2d 111 (1977) (false information supplied
concerning place of birth, high school and college attended, and past criminal record).
315. See 1978 BD. CoMM'Rs GRIEV. & Disc. ANNUAL REP. (failure to disclose informa-
tion with respect to violations of law).
316. S.C. Sup. CT. R. 32, DR 2-110 (Supp. 1984).
317. See In re Baldwin, 278 S.C. 292, 294 S.E.2d 790 (1980); In re Burr, 267 S.C.
419, 228 S.E.2d 678 (1976). S.C. Sup. CT. R. 32, DR 2-110(A)(1)(Supp. 1984) states: "If
permission for withdrawal from employment is required by the rules of a tribunal, a
lawyer shall not withdraw from employment in a proceeding before that tribunal without
its permission." S.C. Sup. CT. CIn. CT. R. PRAC. § 7 (1976) states: "An attorney may be
changed by consent or upon cause shown, and upon such terms as shall be just, upon the
application of the client, by order of the Circuit Judge, and not otherwise."
318. In re Sampson, 259 S.C. 471, 192 S.E.2d 859 (1972) (other attorney not notified
of the change until after the respondent took over the case).
319. See 1979 BD. COMM'RS GRIEV. & Disc. ANNUAL REP. (respondentthreatened to
withdraw and also contacted an adverse party without the consent of the party's attor-
ney in violation of DR 7-104(A)).
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1978 case in which a lawyer was publicly reprimanded for
threatening to divulge client confidences while demanding pay-
ment of an expense item the client disputed owing.32 0
In the two remaining cases,32' lawyers made improper at-
tempts to obtain liability releases from clients in violation of DR
6-102.22 The most recent case on this issue323 was decided in
1983. The respondent refused to return a file unless the client
signed a broad release from liability.3 24 Both the hearing panel
and the Board of Commissioners on Grievances and Discipline
recommended that the complaint be dismissed on the grounds
that the respondent was not really aware of the contents of the
release form because it had been prepared by his secretary, who
testified that she used the same form when previously employed
by other lawyers.3 25 Disagreeing with the findings and recom-
mendations of the hearing panel and the Board, the supreme
court found the evidence sufficient to prove that the respondent
knew the contents of the release and ordered a public repri-
mand.3 26 The opinion in Clark provides a clear message to law-
yers who use similar forms.
IV. EVALUATION OF SOUTH CAROLINA'S DISCIPLINARY SYSTEM
AND SUGGESTED CHANGES
Available statistics demonstrate that South Carolina's disci-
plinary system must be ranked among the most aggressive in the
country in terms of the total number of sanctions imposed.2 7
Moreover, the state's existing system is quite efficient. Although
a large percentage of grievances is dismissed either before or af-
ter a preliminary investigation, the number of dismissals is not
out of line with other jurisdictions. 28 Additionally, the Supreme
Court Rule on Disciplinary Procedure contains stringent dead-
lines and reporting requirements designed to move cases
320. In re Strobel, 271 S.C. 61, 244 S.E.2d 537 (1978).
321. In re Clarke, 278 S.C. 627, 300 S.E.2d 595 (1983); In re Vaught, 268 S.C. 530,
235 S.E.2d 115 (1977).
322. S.C. Sup. CT. R. 32, DR 6-102 (Supp. 1984).
323. In re Clark, 278 S.C. 627, 300 S.E.2d 595 (1983).
324. Id. at 629-30, 300 S.E.2d at 597.
325. Id. at 631, 300 S.E.2d at 598.
326. Id. at 632, 300 S.E.2d at 598-99.
327. See Table 1; see also supra notes 2-3, 334-36, 381-83 and accompanying text.
328. See supra notes 62-69 and accompanying text.
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through the system expeditiously.3 29
Furthermore, in recent years, the South Carolina Supreme
Court has implemented several procedural changes which
greatly improve the organization and efficiency of the Board of
Commissioners on Grievances and Discipline o.3 3  The 1978
changes in the Rule on Disciplinary Procedure, which incorpo-
rated most of the recommendations of the Clark Committee Re-
port and the American Bar Association Standards for Lawyer
Discipline and Disability Proceedings, are particularly notewor-
thy. 13  Another example of the court's sensitivity to needed
changes is the 1983 amendment to the Rule on Disciplinary Pro-
cedure allowing the appointment of associate commissioners to
assist the Board in handling investigations. 2  Over a period of
years, associate commissioners can help reduce significantly the
number of carryover cases.
On the other hand, there is no evidence that the number of
sanctions imposed on lawyers admitted to practice in South Car-
olina is caused by an unusual degree of ethical insensitivity or
incompetence or by any extraordinary factors, such as a greater
than average proclivity to engage in criminal or fraudulent con-
duct. For example, the ratio of grievances per lawyer in South
Carolina is below, or not significantly higher than, the grievance
per lawyer figure in most other states.
3
329. See supra notes 109-16 and accompanying text.
330. The establishment of a client security fund, a requirement of 12 hours annually
in continuing legal education, and the creation of a specialization certification program
by the court can legitimately be viewed as complementing the disciplinary system. These
actions are part of the supreme court's goal of protecting the public and enhancing the
competence of lawyers practicing in South Carolina.
331. See Youngblood, Revised Rule on Disciplinary Procedure, The Transcript,
May, 1978, at 2.
332. See S.C. Sup. CT. R. Disc. P. § 9E (Supp. 1984).
333. Based on 1982 data, the ratio of grievances per lawyer in South Carolina was 7
grievances per 100 lawyers. Of the 7 jurisdictions that have approximately the same
number of lawyers as South Carolina, only Mississippi, with a ratio of 4 grievances per
100 lawyers, was below South Carolina. The highest ratio in this category was in Arizona,
which had 29 grievances per 100 lawyers. The number of grievances per 100 lawyers in
the other 5 jurisdictions used in the sample were: Alabama, 13; Kansas, 7; New Mexico,
24; New York (3d Dept.), 17; and West Virginia, 14. The number of grievances per 100
lawyers in eight of the most populous states for 1982 was as follows: California, 10; Flor-
ida, 13; Illinois, 9; Michigan, 15; New Jersey, 8; Pennsylvania, 9; Virginia, 8; and Wiscon-
sin, 10. ABA STANDING COMM. ON PROF. Disc. AND CENTER FOR PROF. REsP., STATISTICAL
REPORT RE: EXPENSE, CASE VOLUME, AND STAFFING OF LAWYER DISCIPLINARY ENFORCE-
MENT IN STATE JURISDICTIONS DURING 1982, Chart I (1983).
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Compared to other states, perhaps the most distinctive fea-
ture of the South Carolina disciplinary system is the willingness
of the supreme court to impose public sanctions in cases which,
in many states, would be dismissed or would result at most in a
private reprimand. The court's record in neglect cases is the
clearest illustration.3 4 In addition to following a consistent pat-
tern of insisting on sanctions in cases of serious neglect,33 the
court, on several occasions, has ordered restitution of fees and
has made it clear that restitution will not bar any civil claim a
client might have.3 36
This well-designed, efficient disciplinary system with im-
pressive statistics is not necessarily as effective as it could or
should be. The broader questions that must be answered are
whether the disciplinary system is fulfilling its avowed purposes
and, if it is not, what changes are desirable. These questions will
be addressed in the remaining portion of this section.
Lawyer discipline has been thought to accomplish four pur-
poses: removal of deviant lawyers from the system, deterrence of
future misconduct, rehabilitation, and protection of the pub-
lic.3 3 7 Punishment of the offending lawyer is not a stated
purpose.3 38
Because disbarment and indefinite suspension are obviously
harsh sanctions that have disastrous professional and personal
consequences, disciplinary boards and courts have been reluc-
tant to impose these sanctions except in the most egregious
cases. In South Carolina, no evidence exists showing that a sig-
nificant number of cases that should result in disbarment or in-
definite suspension are receiving less severe sanctions. To the
contrary, the South Carolina Supreme Court has ordered indefi-
334. See supra notes 275-83 and accompanying text.
335. See supra notes 279-83 and accompanying text.
336. See, e.g., In re Hopkins, - S.C. -, 318 S.E.2d 112 (1984) (repayment of
$18,000 attorney's fee ordered). See also S.C. Sup. CT. R. Disc. P. §§ 7A, 9E (Supp.
1984) (disgorgement of fees does not bar any other civil or criminal remedy).
337. See generally Steele & Nimmer, supra note 2, at 999-1014; Nordby, supra note
98, at 377-82, 403-09. See also ABA JOINT COMMITTEE ON PROFESSIONAL DIScIPLINE,
STANDARDS FOR LAWYER DISCIPLINE AND DIsABiLITY PROCEEDINGS § 1.1 and commentary
(1979).
338. See, e.g., Maryland State Bar v. Agnew, 271 Md. 543, 318 A.2d 811 (1974). The
South Carolina Supreme Court first recognized this principle in its initial disbarment
case, State v. Holding, 12 S.C.L. (1 McCord) 379 (1821). See also State v. Belcher, 249
S.C. 301, 153 S.E.2d 921 (1967); Burns v. Clayton, 237 S.C. 316, 117 S.E.2d 300 (1960).
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nite suspension or disbarment in some cases in which rehabilita-
tion was perhaps feasible or in which a suspension for a deter-
mined period followed by conditional readmission might have
been a more appropriate remedy.
Nationwide there has been an increased emphasis on the re-
habilitative function of the disciplinary system in recent years.
Procedures such as those in the Supreme Court Rule on Disci-
plinary Procedure that allow lawyers with serious drug abuse,
emotional, or physical problems to be placed on disability inac-
tive status while undergoing treatment rather than being auto-
matically disbarred or indefinitely suspended, represent a signif-
icant and positive change in attitude. 39 Moreover, the increased
use of public and private reprimands in recent years in all states,
including South Carolina, is in part a result of an increased
awareness of the need to stress rehabilitation.34
In South Carolina, deterrence is accomplished principally
through published supreme court opinions imposing public sanc-
tions and published reports from the Board of Commissioners
on Grievances and Discipline summarizing its activities. One
purpose of these published opinions and annual reports is to
alert lawyers to the types of conduct which fall below acceptable
standards and therefore warrant disciplinary sanctions. 4'
The publication of disciplinary actions, particularly in the
local media, is also an important method of informing the public
that the judicial system and the bar are serious about self-regu-
lation. The Supreme Court Rule on Disciplinary Procedure re-
quires such publication. 42 Dissemination of public information
about the disciplinary system also helps to build public confi-
339. See S.C. Sup. CT. R. Disc. P. § 19 (Supp. 1984). See also id. § 7A (competency
training can be ordered). The absence of adequate provisions for disabled lawyers was
one of the criticisms of disciplinary systems made in the Clark Committee Report. See
CLARK COMM[IITEE REPORT, supra note 1, at 110-115. See generally Skoler & Klein,
Mental Disability and Lawyer Discipline, 12 J. MAR. J. PRAC. & PROC. 227 (1979).
340. See generally Steele & Nimmer, supra note 2, at 935-38. Chart IV, Part I of
the 1984 Statistical Report Re: Public Discipline of Lawyers by Disciplinary Agencies,
1979-83, published by the ABA Committee on Professional Discipline and Center for
Professional Responsibility, indicates that during the five year reporting period used in
the report, the number of disbarments rose cumulatively by 41% while the number of
public reprimands rose cumulatively by 54%, the number of probations rose cumula-
tively by 58%, and the number of sanctions such as fines, costs, restitution, and proba-
tion rose cumulatively by 201%. The ABA data does not include private reprimands.
341. See generally Gray & Harrison, supra note 98, at 553-57.
342. See S.C. Sup. CT. R. Disc. P. §§ 6A, 7B, 19D, 20G (Supp. 1984).
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dence in the judicial system and the bar. The public confidence
generated in this manner outweighs the adverse affect on the
bar's image that may result from allowing the public to see the
bar's dirty linen.
3 43
Requiring restitution is another way to achieve the public
protection function of the disciplinary system. The emphasis in
requiring restitution, however, is on client protection rather than
on protection of the public in general. The supreme court has
ordered restitution in many recent cases3 44 and has emphasized
the importance of this remedy by amending the Rule on Disci-
plinary Procedure in October 1983 to specifically include restitu-
tion as one of the authorized sanctions.34
A logical conclusion to be drawn from the above analysis is
that South Carolina's disciplinary system achieves its basic
goals. This statement is certainly true of the grievances
processed in the system. One important question that remains
unanswered, however, is whether all cases that should be han-
dled as disciplinary cases are in fact reported to the Board of
Commissioners on Grievances and Discipline. To put this issue
in its proper prospective, two additional factors must be
considered.
First, the disciplinary system is designed to deal only with
behavior that evidences indifference to, or conscious disregard
for, the responsibilities a lawyer owes to clients and to the pub-
lic.3 46 The system cannot, and should not, conclusively decide
every act of negligence or other breach of the attorney-client re-
lationship. 47 Malpractice actions, fines, assessment of attorneys'
fees and other civil and criminal suits are available for dealing
with deviant behavior not sufficiently egregious to justify disci-
343. See generally CLARK COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 1, at 143-46.
344. See, e.g., In re Pyatt, 280 S.C. 302, 312 S.E.2d 553 (1984); In re Burgess, 275
S.C. 315, 270 S.E.2d 436 (1980).
345. See S.C. Sup. CT. R. Disc. P. §§ 7A, 9E (Supp. 1984).
346. See, e.g., ABA JOINT COMMITTEE ON PROFESSIONAL DISCIPLINE, STANDARDS FOR
LAWYER DISCIPLINE AND DISABILITY PROCEEDINGS § 1.1 (1979)("The purpose of lawyer dis-
cipline and disability proceedings is to... protect the public and the administration of
justice from lawyers who have demonstrated by their conduct that they are unable or are
likely to be unable to properly discharge their professional duties").
347. See ABA Comm. on Professional Responsibility and Ethics, Formal Op. 335
N.1 (1974); ABA Comm. on Professional Responsibility and Ethics, Informal Op. 1273
(1973) (distinguishes neglect, which can result in a disciplinary sanction under DR 6-
101(A)(3) of the ABA Model CPR, and negligence).
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plinary sanctions.3 48 Disciplinary, criminal, and malpractice re-
lated actions should not, however, be mutually exclusive.
3 49
There are cases in which both sets of remedies are appropri-
ate.350 In such cases, the fact that a lawyer receives a civil or
criminal sanction should not preclude the imposition of a disci-
plinary sanction for the same behavior or vice versa.3 51 More-
348. The number of these nondisciplinary sanctions has increased dramatically in
recent years. See generally R. MALLEN & V. LEVIT, LEGAL MALPRACTICE § 6 (2d ed. 1931);
Sofear, Sanctioning Attorneys for Discovery Abuse Under the New Federal Rules: On
the Limited Utility of Punishment, 57 ST. JOHNS L. REV. 680 (1983); Comment, Sanc-
tions Imposed by Courts on Attorneys Who Abuse the Judicial Process, 44 U. CI. L.
REv. 619 (1977).
349. The Preamble and Preliminary Statement of the ABA Code of Professional
Responsibility states that the Code does not define standards for civil liability of lawyers
for professional conduct. This statement is generally interpreted to mean that the Code
cannot be used to create new civil causes of action against lawyers but the provisions in
the Code are admissible as evidence of the required standard of conduct for lawyers. See,
e.g., Bickel v. Mackie, 447 F. Supp. 1376, 1383-84 (N.D. Iowa), aff'd, 590 F.2d 341 (8th
Cir. 1978); Bush v. Morris, 123 Ga. App. 497, 181 S.E.2d 503 (1971). See also Lipton v.
Boesky, 110 Mich. App. 589, 313 N.W.2d 163 (1981) (violation of a Code disciplinary rule
creates a rebuttable presumption of malpractice). See generally Wolfram, The Code of
Professional Responsibility as a Measure of Attorney Liability in Civil Litigation, 30
S.C.L. REv. 281 (1979); MALLEN & LEVIT, supra note 348, at §§67, 256. The interconnec-
tion between the Code of Professional Responsibility and malpractice actions is dramati-
cally illustrated by the following statistics: 62.43% of all malpractice claims concern ei-
ther neglect or some other form of incompetence and 14.14% concern claims alleging
failure of a lawyer to obtain proper consent of the client or to follow the client's instruc-
tions, Gates, The Newest Data on Lawyers' Malpractice Claims, 70 A.B.A. J. 78, 80,
Figure 5 (1984).
There are a number of situations in which the courts are called upon to enforce the
Code of Professional Responsibility that do not concern either a disciplinary proceeding
or a malpractice or similar action. Courts, for example, frequently use the guidelines in
A.B.A. Code of Professional Responsibility DR 2-106 in awarding attorney fees. See, e.g.,
Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express, Inc., 488 F.2d 714, 719 (5th Cir. 1974). Similarly,
courts regularly use the guidelines in DR 5-105 in deciding disqualification of counsel
motions based on alleged conflicts of interests. See, e.g., Woodruff v. Tomlin, 593 F.2d 33
(6th Cir. 1979). See also In re Goodwin, 279 S.C. 274, 305 S.E.2d 578 (1983) (contempt
citation); Brode v. Brode, 278 S.C. 457, 298 S.E.2d 443 (1982) (appeal against wishes of
client); State v. Wright, 271 S.C. 534, 248 S.E.2d 490 (1978) (assertion of questionable
defense in criminal trial).
350. See, e.g., In re Estate of Gould, 547 S.W.2d 863 (Mo. App. 1977) (lawyer dis-
barred for his misconduct in handling an estate, subsequently removed as executor of the
estate and denied attorney's fees).
351. See, e.g., S.C. Sup. CT. R. Disc. P. §§ 6, 7A, 9E (Supp. 1984); In re Ramsey, 279
S.C. 29, 301 S.E.2d 470 (1983) (criminal conviction); In re Treacy, 277 S.C. 514, 290
S.E.2d 240 (1980). In a disciplinary action following a criminal conviction, the underlying
facts cannot be relitigated. See S.C. Sup. CT. R. Disc. P. § 6B (Supp. 1984). On the other
hand, when the disciplinary action follows a civil judgment against the lawyer, the courts
have generally held that the respondent is not collaterally estopped from challenging the
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over, the dismissal of a civil or criminal action should not pre-
clude the imposition of a disciplinary sanction for the same
conduct.35 2 In other words, in order to evaluate the effectiveness
of lawyer discipline, one must view the disciplinary system as an
important, but not exclusive, method for resolving attorney-cli-
ent disputes and ethical problems.
Secondly, available evidence indicates that lawyers and
judges, who are in a better position than clients to recognize
conduct warranting investigation by a disciplinary board, do not
report all such conduct 353 despite their being ethically obligated
to do so. 54 This reluctance to report fellow lawyers is due in
large measure to an ingrained, self-protective, guild attitude.
Some of this reluctance may, however, result from a perception
that the disciplinary system is based essentially on a criminal
justice model and is too harsh and impersonal. 55
Whatever the reasons, the fact remains that there are prob-
ably a significant number of unreported disciplinary cases. Con-
versely, many grievances processed by the disciplinary system do
findings in the prior action. See, e.g., In re Guggi, 273 Or. 463, 541 P.2d 1392 (1975);
Committee on Legal Ethics v. Mullins, 226 S.E.2d 427 (W. Va. 1976). Different standards
of proof in criminal, civil, and disciplinary actions explain these holdings. See supra
notes 104-05 and accompanying text.
When the disciplinary action is brought first, it is an unsettled question whether the
findings of fact in the disciplinary action are binding in a subsequent civil action. Com-
pare In re Gould, 547 S.W.2d 863 (Mo. App. 1977), with Kuehn v. Garcia, 608 F.2d 1143
(8th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 943 (1980) and Lipton v. Boesky, 110 Mich. App.
589, 313 N.W.2d 163 (1981). Although the burden of proof is lower in a civil action than
in a disciplinary action (preponderance of the evidence versus clear and convincing evi-
dence), some states require mutuality of parties as a prerequisite to applying collateral
estoppel. See generally Wolfram, supra note 349, at 297-300.
352. See, e.g., S.C. Sup. CT. R. Disc. P. § 6E (Supp. 1984)(reversal of a criminal
conviction will not terminate a disciplinary proceeding); In re Davis, 276 S.C. 532, 280
S.E.2d 644 (1981). A malpractice action, for example, may be barred by the statute of
limitations or dismissed because the plaintiff cannot prove any damages caused by the
malpractice. As was pointed out earlier, the statute of limitations does not apply in disci-
plinary actions and damages are not a prerequisite to imposition of a sanction.
353. See Ramage-White, The Lawyer's Duty to Report Professional Misconduct, 20
ARIZ. L. REv. 509 (1978); Thode, The Duty of Lawyers and Judges to Report Other
Attorneys' Breaches of the Standards of the Legal Profession, 1976 UTAH L. REv. 95.
See also Steele & Nimmer, supra note 2, at 973 (only 8.1% of all grievances filed by
lawyers and judges).
354. See S.C. Sup. CT. R. 32, DR 1-103(B)(Supp. 1984). This disclosure duty also
exists under the Model Rules of Professional Conduct. See MODEL RULES OF PROFES-
SIONAL CONDUCT Rule 8.3.
355. See Martyn, Lawyer Competence and Lawyer Dscipline: Beyond the Bar, 69
GEo. L.J. 705, 711-12 (1981).
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not warrant disciplinary action but may warrant some other
remedy. The combination of underreporting potential sanction
cases and overreporting nonsanction cases places a serious strain
on the disciplinary system-a strain that grows more severe as
the number of client-generated grievances increases. Coping
more successfully with this underreporting-overreporting prob-
lem is perhaps the most challenging issue facing disciplinary
boards in this country.
The following suggestions for improving the disciplinary
system in South Carolina, many of which will probably be re-
garded as controversial, should not be taken as a condemnation
of the present system. Rather, the purpose of the suggestions is
to improve a good system.
A. Screening Process Modifications
Some restructuring of the screening process is needed be-
cause of the increase in the number of cases. During the past
two years, the Board of Commissioners on Grievances and Disci-
pline averaged approximately one grievance per day. While
many grievances are frivolous, all must be carefully studied to
make certain that worthy cases are not overlooked. Letters must
be written to the complainants acknowledging receipt of the
grievances. In cases that are dismissed, letters should be sent ex-
plaining the reasons for the dismissal. Furthermore, a file con-
taining a summary of the charges and the reasons for the action
taken must be maintained for each grievance, even those that
are dismissed without investigation.3 56 The chairman of the Ex-
ecutive Committee, who is usually an active practitioner, is re-
sponsible for performing all of these screening steps in addition
to the many other time-consuming duties assigned to the chair-
man by the Supreme Court Rule on Disciplinary Procedure. No
matter how conscientious the chairman may be, there are limits
to the amount of time he or she can reasonably be expected to
spend on Board duties. At some point, either the chairman will
not be able to read all the grievance letters as carefully as they
should be read, or a nonlawyer employee of the Board must do
the preliminary screening.
356. See S.C. Sup. CT. R. Disc. P. § 4C (Supp. 1984).
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Many disciplinary agencies solve this time problem by dele-
gating preliminary screening to the legal staff employed by the
agency. This is the system recommended in the ABA Standards
for Lawyer Discipline and Disability Proceedings.57 Assuming
modest turnover in the legal staff, this approach will likely result
in more long-term consistent treatment of cases than is possible
under the present system, in which the chairman usually serves
for one year and cannot serve for more than three years.3 5s Legal
staff screening would also reduce the likelihood of a case backlog
because of a chairman's practice obligations or other responsibil-
ities. With the ever increasing number of grievances, it may take
several years to clear up a substantial backlog of cases created in
prior years.
Implementing a bar counsel screening system in South Car-
olina will necessitate major staff changes. As mentioned previ-
ously,359 several assistant attorneys general currently handle, on
a part-time basis, some investigations and all of the prosecution
of formal complaints. Assigning screening functions to the Attor-
ney General's office would create two potential problems. First,
the Attorney General would have to allocate more manpower to
the Board's work; and second, he would probably have to obtain
additional funding from the legislature for these increased
responsibilities.
Alternatively, the supreme court could include funds for le-
gal staff3 60 assigned to the Board in its budget or pass the cost
on to the bar in the form of a yearly assessment. This approach
has the institutional advantage of bringing the entire discipli-
nary system under the direct control of the court. On the other
hand, the court might not wish to allocate part of its funds for
this purpose, and many members of the bar may object to the
assessment of additional fees.361
357. See ABA JOINT CoMATrrra ON PROFESSIONAL DISCIPLINE, STANDARDS FOR LAW-
YER DISCIPLINE AND DIsABILITY PROCEEDINGS §§ 3.8, 3.9, 8.4 (1979).
358. See S.C. Sup. CT. R. Disc. P. §§ 3A, 4A (Supp. 1984).
359. See supra note 45 and accompanying text.
360. Based on the time now spent by the assistant attorneys general currently as-
signed to disciplinary cases, it would take at least two full-time staff lawyers to perform
the functions performed by the Attorney General's office. The Board would also have to
hire an investigative staff. Assigning screening responsibilities and some of the investiga-
tive responsibilities now performed by Board members and associate commissioners to
staff counsel would also necessitate additional legal manpower.
361. According to 1982 data compiled by the ABA Standing Committee on Profes-
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A third possibility would decentralize the screening process
somewhat by encouraging the establishment of local bar associa-
tion client relations committees with authority to accept griev-
ances that do not present a prima facie case of misconduct war-
ranting disciplinary sanctions. At least three such "committees
already exist in South Carolina. 62 The most active is the
Charleston County Bar Association Grievance Committee, which
in 1983 handled approximately fifty complaints of alleged pro-
fessional misconduct against Charleston attorneys.36 3  The
Charleston Grievance Committee advises all complainants that
only the Board of Commissioners on Grievances and Discipline
has authority to impose disciplinary sanctions; and it refers to
the Board any case alleging serious ethical impropriety.
3 6 4
The 1983 Annual Report of the Charleston Grievance Com-
mittee indicates that approximately one-half of the complaints
it received concerned minor communication problems in which
the lawyer had taken appropriate action but had failed to inform
the client of the status of the matter in a timely manner. A sub-
stantial number of the remaining cases concerned fee misunder-
standings, minor disputes over payments from settlement funds,
and the client's right to the return of a file or any unearned por-
tion of a fee at the termination of the attorney's representa-
tion.365 Most of the disputes were amicably resolved with a
member of the committee acting as an intermediary between the
client and the lawyer. 66 In the cases that could not be resolved,
sional Discipline and Center for Professional Responsibility, in 38 states the entire cost
of administering the disciplinary system is paid for by bar association dues or court as-
sessed fees. ABA STANDING COMM. ON PRoF. Disc. AND CENTER FOR PROF. REsp., STATISTI-
CAL REPORT RE: EXPENSE, CASE VOLUME, AND STAFFING OF LAWYER DIscIPLINARY EN-
FORCEMENT IN STATE JURISDICTIONS DURING 1982, Chart III (1983).
362. A telephone poll of the bar presidents in South Carolina's major metropolitan
areas located local bar association grievance committees in Charleston, Greenville and
Spartanburg. For many years, the Richland County Bar Association had a grievance
committee but the committee was discontinued a few years ago.
363. See 1983 GRIEV. COMM. OF CHARLESTON COUNTY BAR Ass'N ANNUAL REP. (avail-
able at Charleston County Bar Office).
364. Telephone interview with Gordon P. Schreck, Esq., Chairman of the Grievance
Committee of the Charleston County Bar (Aug. 7, 1984).
365. The Charleston Grievance Committee refers genuine fee disputes to the South
Carolina Bar Resolution of Fee Disputes Board. Id. The Board of Commissioners on
Grievances and Discipline also routinely follows this practice.
366. The 1983 Annual Report makes the interesting observation that many clients
are not interested in having the respondent fired or sanctioned. 1983 GRrxv. COMM. OF
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the complainants were sent letters reminding them of their right
to file a grievance with the Board of Commissioners on Griev-
ances and Discipline, and, in appropriate cases, suggesting that
they might wish to consult an attorney concerning the possibil-
ity of a civil suit.
3 67
Members of local committees, who do not have the caseload
responsibilities of the chairman or members of the state's griev-
ance Board, have more time to perform this mediation role.
Moreover, lawyers against whom allegations are filed are gener-
ally willing to work out a settlement agreeable to the client be-
cause of peer pressure from members of the local committees
and the lawyers' fear of the mental anguish and potential blem-
ishes on their official records which would result if the griev-
ances were filed with the Board of Commissioners on Grievances
and Discipline. In short, these local committees perform a valua-
ble screening function and, by informally resolving minor attor-
ney-client disputes, promote the public image of the bar. 8
Local committees should be called client relations commit-
tees rather than grievance committees to distinguish them from
the Board and to describe their function accurately. Uniform
guidelines governing the operation of these client relations com-
mittees could be developed by the Board of Commissioners on
Grievances and Discipline and approved by the court.369 These
guidelines should describe the authority of the local committee,
the circumstances under which allegations of misconduct must
be forwarded to the Board, and the disclosures concerning the
committee's limited jurisdiction that will be required to be made
to all complainants. The guidelines should also require a local
CHARLESTON COUNTY BAR Ass'N ANNUAL REP. The clients' primary goal is to get their
legal problems resolved in an expeditious manner. Id.
367. The Greenville and Spartanburg County Bar Association Grievance Commit-
tees follow similar guidelines. Telephone interview with Patrick Grayson, Esq., Green-
ville County Bar Association (Aug. 7, 1984); telephone interview with Timothy Cleve-
land, Esq., Spartanburg County Bar Association (Aug. 16, 1984).
368. Because the vast majority of grievances are lawyer-client disputes which do not
warrant disciplinary sanctions, the need to have an effective mechanism for mediating
these nondisciplinary cases is great. Disciplinary agencies have traditionally undertaken
this task, subject to time limitations. See generally Steele & Nimmer, supra note 2, at
985-90.
369.'The California Supreme Court approved guidelines for local client relations
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committee to keep files on each complaint, containing the same
information that the Board of Commissioners on Grievances and
Discipline is required to include in its files. In addition, the com-
mittees should submit periodic reports to the Board using an
approved reporting format developed by the Board. These rec-
ord keeping requirements will enable the Board, and the court,
to monitor the activities of these client relations committees.
The vast majority of client complaints against lawyers will
still be filed with the Board. As a practical matter, these client
relations committees will probably be established only in the
larger cities. Nevertheless, the committees can potentially re-
duce the number of grievances being filed with the Board, or at
least slow the rate of the caseload increase 7 0
B. Hearing Stage Modifications
It is well established that a disciplinary hearing is sui
generis and, consequently, the full panoply of constitutional due
process rights available in civil and criminal trials do not ap-
ply.s71 Nevertheless, given the potential impact on the respon-
dent's legal career, a sense of "fairness" should be built into the
disciplinary process. With this principle in mind, there are three
changes in the hearing stage procedures under the South Caro-
lina Rule on Disciplinary Procedure that should be seriously
considered.
First, there is no provision in the Rule that specifically au-
thorizes the Attorney General to request a review of a com-
plaint, prior to a hearing, to determine whether the grievance
should be dismissed because of insufficiency of evidence or other
weaknesses discovered during the investigation that follows the
decision to issue a complaint. By contrast, a solicitor has an eth-
ical duty not to force a criminal defendant to undergo the
trauma of a trial in such circumstances.7 2 The apparent inabil-
ity of the Attorney General to exercise similar discretion in a
disciplinary proceeding once a complaint has been issued
370. On the other hand, if the South Carolina Surpeme Court decides to abolish the
existing committees, the number of grievances filed with the Board of Commissioners on
Grievances and Discipline would increase substantially.
371. See supra notes 97-108 and accomanying text.
372. See S.C. Sup. CT. R. § 32, EC 7-13 and DR 7-103(A)(Supp. 1984).
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presents a serious issue of fairness.
Removing the requirement in the Rule that discovery is
available only upon approval by the chairman of the Board of
Commissioners on Grievances and Discipline-7 3 should also be
seriously considered. Historically, the chairman has rarely au-
thorized depositions or any other type of discovery. The appar-
ent purpose of the "good cause" requirement is to prevent the
use of discovery as a delaying or harrasing tactic by the respon-
dent. These and other discovery abuses, however, can be curbed
by limiting the discovery period, authorizing protective orders,
and imposing monetary and other sanctions." 4
At the very least, the process should allow the respondent to
take the complainant's deposition as a matter of right. Addition-
ally, the respondent should be given the same access to state-
ments of witnesses and exculpatory and mitigating evidence al-
lowed a criminal defendant. 7 5 The inability to review the
disciplinary file, combined with the absence of a right to discov-
ery, unduly restricts the ability of an attorney representing a re-
spondent to prepare a defense to a grievance or to advise a re-
spondent on the best course of action.
A final change that should be considered is the elimination
of the requirement that a lawyer must admit all of the facts in a
complaint when consenting to discipline other than disbarment
by consent. 76 The principal purpose of the consent rule is to
encourage a proper disposition of a disciplinary complaint prior
to a hearing, and if not then, before the appellate process is
completed. Allowing the Attorney General and a respondent
room for bargaining over the facts stipulated in the consent or-
der would significantly increase the number of cases in which a
respondent will view consent discipline as a viable alternative.3 77
373. See S.C. Sup. CT. R. Disc. P. § 28D (Supp. 1984).
374. See S.C. SUP. CT. CIR. CT. PRAC. R. 87H, 96 (1976 & Supp. 1984)(protective
orders). See also Comment, supra note 348. Section 8.29 of the ABA Standards for Law-
yer Discipline and Disability Proceedings authorize discovery as a matter of right by
both sides for "a limited period following the filing of an answer." The commentary to §
8.29 states that the time for discovery should be strictly limited to no more than 90 days.
375. See S.C. Sup. CT. Cm. CT. PRAC. R. 103 (Supp. 1984); Note, The Prosecutorial
Duty to Disclose Exculpatory Information, 34 S.C.L. REv. 67 (1982). See also S.C. Sup.
CT. R. 32, EC 7-13 and DR 7-103(B)(Supp. 1984).
376. See S.C. Sup. CT. R. Disc. P. § 28A (Supp. 1984).
377. Through June 1983, consent discipline under S.C. Sup. CT. R. Disc. P. § 28
(Supp. 1984) had been approved in only one case. See In re Gamble, 278 S.C. 651, 300
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Because the supreme court must approve all consent orders,"'
the danger of abuse is minimal.
C. Sanction Modifications
Until the adoption of an amendment approved in October
1984, the Supreme Court Rule on Disciplinary Procedure au-
thorized only four types of sanctions: permanent disbarment, in-
definite suspension, and public and private reprimands. 7 e In
fact, there were actually only three sanction categories because
only three lawyers placed on indefinite suspension have ever
been reinstated.38 0 As Table 4 indicates, 38 ' forty percent of all
sanction cases from January 1969 through June 1984 resulted in
either disbarment or indefinite suspension. If consent disbar-
ments and attorney resignations while under investigation for
misconduct are included in the figures, the percentage of disbar-
ments and indefinite suspensions increases to forty-five per-
cent.38 2 This figure is significantly higher than that of other
states. 383
The harshness of this South Carolina sanction scheme is il-
lustrated by the 1983 case of In re Lanier.3 84 The respondent in
Lanier was admitted to practice in both North and South Caro-
S.E.2d 737 (1983)(consent to public reprimand). As a practical matter, whenever serious
charges and factual disputes exist, it may be difficult to reach an acceptable agreement
on consent discipline prior to a hearing. After a hearing, however, the supreme court may
not be willing to accept a sanction less than that recommended by the hearing panel or
by the Board. The change in § 28A suggested in the text would make it easier to negoti-
ate a prehearing consent agreement. See also supra notes 153-56, 200 and accompanying
text.
378. See S.C. Sup. CT. R. Disc. P. § 28A (Supp. 1984).
379. S.C. Sup. CT. R. Disc. P. § 7A (Supp. 1984). The Rule on Disciplinary Proce-
dure also authorizes disgorgement of attorney's fees and remedial action where the mis-
conduct is based in part on incompetence.
380. See supra note 176 and accompanying text. According to data compiled by the
National Discipline Data Bank, in 1983 there were 612 suspensions and 157 reinstate-
ments in the United States. The equivalent figures for 1982 were 557 suspensions and
117 reinstatements; for 1981, 490 suspensions and 112 reinstatements; for 1980, 413 sus-
pensions and 144 reinstatements; and for 1979, 390 suspensions and 152 reinstatements.
ABA STANDING COMM. ON PROF. DIsc. AND CENTER FOR PROF. RESP., STATISTICAL REPORT
RE: PUBLIC DISCIPLINE OF LAWYERS BY DISCIPLINARY AGENCIES 1979-1983, Chart II (1984).
381. See Table 4.
382. See supra note 207 and accompanying text.
383. See supra notes 210-11 and accompanying text.
384. 279 S.C. 458, 309 S.E.2d 754 (1983).
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lina and was suspended in North Carolina for a one-year period
following a guilty plea to a charge of felonious possession of ma-
rijuana s38  Under the reciprocal discipline provision in the Su-
preme Court Rule on Disciplinary Procedure, a lawyer disci-
plined in one state is supposed to receive the identical discipline
in South Carolina unless the respondent can prove mitigating
factors.38 6 Although the respondent's suspension had lapsed and
he was once again practicing law in North Carolina, the South
Carolina Supreme Court issued an order of indefinite suspension
stating that this was the closest equivalent sanction authorized
by the Rule on Disciplinary Procedure.8
The supreme court's adoption in October 1984 of a rule au-
thorizing temporary suspension for a definite period up to two
years388 provides much needed flexibility in the South Carolina
sanction scheme. Unlike the procedure recommended by the
ABA Standards for Lawyer Discipline and Disability Proceed-
ings,"" however, the new South Carolina suspension rule does
not allow a lawyer suspended for six months or less to be rein-
stated automatically at the termination of the suspension pe-
riod. The revised Rule on Disciplinary Procedure requires the
filing of a petition for reinstatement in all cases of suspension
for a definite period, and the granting of the petition is discre-
tionary.390 Because of the supreme court's workload, adoption of
the automatic reinstatement rule in the ABA Standards should
385. Id. at 459-60, 309 S.E.2d at 755.
386. See S.C. Sup. CT. R. Disc. P. § 29 (Supp. 1984).
387. The Rule on Disciplinary Procedure requires a lawyer who is indefinitely sus-
pended to wait at least two years to apply for reinstatement. Id. § 37. Because the re-
spondent's North Carolina suspension was completed, it appears that the court could
reasonably have held that the case was a proper one for a lesser sanction under the
reciprocal discipline provision in § 29. Notably, one lawyer in South Carolina who plead
guilty to possession of marijuana received only a private reprimand in 1975. See 1975 BD.
COMM'Rs GRIEV. & Disc. ANNUAL REP.
388. See Davis Advance Sheets No. 51, Oct. 27, 1984 (amending S.C. SUP. CT. R.
DIsc. P. §§ 7A, 37, 38 (Supp. 1984)). Another important change made by the October
1984 amendments was the elimination of a former provision in § 8 of the rule which
imposed an automatic minimum sanction against previously disciplined lawyers. See
supra notes 180-82 and accompanying text.
389. ABA JOINT COMMITTE ON PROFESSIONAL DIsCipLINE, STANDARDS FOR LAWYER
DISCIPLINE AND DISABILITY PROCEEDINGS § 6.4 (1979). The ABA Standards also allow a
suspension for a set term of up to three years as opposed to the two-year standard
adopted by the South Carolina Supreme Court in October 1984. See id. § 6.3.
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be seriously considered.
Two other provisions in the ABA Standards for Lawyer Dis-
cipline and Disability Proceedings should also be carefully stud-
ied. First, under the ABA Standards, a disbarred lawyer may ap-
ply for reinstatement after five years.39' Under the South
Carolina Rule on Disciplinary Procedure, however, disbarment is
permanent.32 Second, probation for up to two years is specifi-
cally authorized by the ABA Standards.393 For example, a lawyer
undergoing treatment for alcohol abuse on an out-patient basis
could be placed on probation and continue to practice law under
the supervision of another lawyer without being placed on disa-
bility inactive status.39 4 Similarly, an inexperienced lawyer who
has committed a relatively minor ethical violation could be
391. ABA JOINT COMMITTEE ON PROFESSIONAL DIsCIPLINE, STANDARDS FOR LAWYER
DISCIPLINE AND DISABILITY PROCEEDINGS § 6.2 (1979).
392. S.C. Sup. CT. R. DISC. P. § 8A (Supp. 1984).
393. See ABA JOINT COMMITrEE ON PROFESSIONAL DISCIPLINE, STANDARDS FOR LAW-
YER DISCIPLINE AND DISABILITY PROCEEDINGS § 6.7 (1979).
394. Id. § 6.7 commentary. Under the ABA Standards, probation may be used as an
independent sanction or in conjunction with another sanction. See In re LaRocque, 295
N.W.2d 97 (Minn. 1980) (probation following one year suspension); In re Heffernan, 315
N.W.2d 13 (Minn. 1984) (public reprimand, three-month suspension and three-year su-
pervised probation). Probation may also be used in conjunction with letters of admoni-
tion. See ABA JOINT COMMITTEE ON PROFESSIONAL DISCIPLINE, STANDARDS FOR LAWYER
DISCIPLINE AND DISABILITY PROCEEDINGS §§ 8.19, 8.20 (1979). See also infra notes 396-405
and accompanying text.
Section 7A of the Supreme Court Rule on Disciplinary Procedure authorizes the
imposition of remedial action when the misconduct is caused by incompetence. It ap-
pears that remedial action, which is a form of probation, may only be ordered if either a
private sanction or public reprimand is imposed. It is also unclear whether a remedial
action under § 7A could be used as a condition of a lesser sanction, e.g., a public repri-
mand if the probationary terms are met, but if not, then indefinite suspension. The
South Carolina Supreme Court utilized this concept in a case decided before the promul-
gation of the Rule on Disciplinary Procedure. See State v. Jennings, 161 S.C. 263, 159
S.E.2d 627 (1931)(disbarment suspended on condition of $30,000 repayment of funds
improperly withdrawn from the estate of a minor). The court also recently used this
technique to require a lawyer to return property to former clients. See In re Pyatt, 280
S.C. 302, 312 S.E.2d 553 (1984) (public reprimand would be automatically increased to
an indefinite suspension if property was not conveyed to clients within 30 days).
The Rule on Disciplinary Procedure also authorizes the supreme court to direct that
a lawyer reinstated after an indefinite suspension "limit his practice to certain areas of
the law; work under the supervision of another attorney; require reports at intervals or
any other reasonable requirement that will insure the protection of the public and the
administration of justice." S.C. Sup. CT. R. DIsc. P. § 38B (Supp. 1984). This rule is
closer to the concept of probation envisioned by A.B.A. Standard § 6.7 than the more
limited remedial action rule in § 7A of the Supreme Court Rule on Disciplinary
Procedure.
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placed on supervisory probation instead of having to suffer the
stigma of a public sanction or a private reprimand.9 5 These pro-
visions, which emphasize the rehabilitative aspect of disciplinary
proceedings, would provide desirable additional flexibility in the
South Carolina sanction format.
D. Authorization of Admonitions
One of the principal recommendations of the landmark
Clark Committee Report of 1970 was the adoption of letters of
admonition in cases in which the respondent's conduct was not
serious enough to warrant an official sanction, but was indicative
of a failure to observe acceptable standards of conduct. The ad-
monition letter would warn the respondent that similar behavior
in the future might result in a sanction. The letter of admonition
would be kept as part of the permanent records of the discipli-
nary agency and would be admissible in any future grievance
proceeding involving the respondent, who would have the right
to protest the admonition and demand a full hearing. 96 Many
states3 97 have adopted the admonition letter and the concept is
included in ABA Standards for Lawyer Discipline and Disability
Proceedings.39 s
Between 1968 and 1980, the Board of Commissioners on
Grievances and Discipline issued eighty-six admonitions, which
it called "letters of caution." 399 The supreme court ordered this
practice discontinued in 1981,400 stating that the letters were not
specifically authorized by the Rule on Disciplinary Procedure.
The court's reaction was apparently prompted by the fear that
letters of caution were being used in cases in which at least a
private reprimand was warranted. Substantial evidence existed
supporting the court's fear. An examination of the summaries
395. See S.C. Sup. CT. R. Disc. P. § 7A (Supp. 1984).
396. See CLARK COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 1, at 7, 92-96.
397. See Steele & Nimmer, supra note 2, at 940, Table 1 (of the 43 jurisdictions
surveyed, 79% authorize admonition letters); Dubin & Schwartz, supra note 78, at 8-9
(194 admonition letters issued between October 1, 1981, and September 30, 1982).
398. ABA JOINT COMMITTEE ON PROFESSIONAL DISCIPLINE, STANDARDS FOR LAWYER
DISCIPLINE AND DISABILITY PROCEEDINGS §§ 8.10, 8.17 (1979). Under §§ 8.18 and 8.19 the
respondent can contest the letter of admonition and demand a formal hearing.
399. See Table 1.
400. In re Davis, 276 S.C. 532, 280 S.E.2d 644 (1981). See also In re Belser, 277 S.C.
250, 287 S.E.2d 139 (1982).
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published in the Board's annual reports reveals very little differ-
ence between the fact patterns of many of the private repri-
mands and those of the letters of caution. Significant differences
may have existed but they were not readily apparent in the pub-
lished summaries in the annual reports. Moreover, in 1980 the
Board issued twenty letters of caution but no private repri-
mands, although, in 1979, the Board issued eight letters of cau-
tion and eleven private reprimands.4 °'
Clearly, the supreme court was justified in questioning the
use of letters of caution. However, perhaps it istime to reexam-
ine this issue. The danger in refusing to allow letters of caution
is the implication to lawyers and the public that the conduct in
question is being officially condoned because the grievance is of-
ficially dismissed.402 Although the cases in which admonitions or
letters of caution are justified do not warrant a sanction, the
conduct involved usually merits at least a warning to the offend-
ing lawyer, and, where appropriate, suggestions for corrective ac-
tion.4 03 Additionally, the inclusion of a summary of the facts
prompting letters of caution as part of the Board's annual report
will have an in terrorem effect on other lawyers.404
The potential abusive use of letters of caution can be mini-
mized by requiring the Board to submit to the supreme court an
annual report stating the basic facts of each case and the reasons
why a letter of caution rather than another remedy was deemed
appropriate. If this procedure is not considered sufficient, the
court could assign the task of reviewing letters of caution to one
or more of its members. 405 Another possible monitoring device
401. See 1979 & 1980 BD. CosuaM'Rs GRIEV. & Disc. ANNUAL REPS.
402. See CLARK Corihirra REPORT, supra note 1, at 92-96.
403. Under the ABA Standards for Lawyer Discipline and Disability Proceedings, a
lawyer issued a letter of admonition can be placed on supervised probation. See ABA
JOINT COMMITTEE ON PROFESSIONAL DISCIPLINE, STANDARDS FOR LAWYER DISCIPLINE AND
DISABILITY PROCEEDINGS §§ 8.19, 8.20 (1979). This provision increases the flexibility of
the sanction scheme.
404. Several of the letters of caution issued by the Board served that purpose. For
example, a letter of caution issued in 1980 stated that it was improper to charge a con-
tingency fee for any recovery received by a client for personal injury protection insurance
coverage and warned that disciplinary sanctions would be imposed in the future for simi-
lar conduct.
405. A supreme court justice could review a file before the letter of caution was
issued or review on an annual basis all the files in which letters of caution were issued. If
abuses were discovered, the supreme court could discontinue the authorization or impose
additional restrictions on their use.
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for the system is to limit letters of caution to only those griev-
ances that have been previously assigned to an investigator, and
to have a procedural rule under which a vote by the Executive
Committee on whether to recommend a letter of caution would
be taken only after the Executive Committee had voted in favor
of dismissing the grievance.
E. Competency Peer Review System
The issue of neglect is present in the majority of the disci-
plinary sanction cases which involve failure to act competently
according to the mandate of DR 6-101.406 Relatively few discipli-
nary sanctions have been imposed for inadequate knowledge and
preparation, although there have been a significant number of
malpractice verdicts against lawyers for these categories of
incompetence.07
Disciplinary sanctions and malpractice verdicts, however,
deal with only the most serious cases of incompetence. For many
years, the organized bar has been searching for effective ways of
discovering and remedying minor acts of incompetence so that
these more serious adverse consequences can be avoided. 0 8 Con-
tinuing legal education programs, particularly mandatory educa-
tion programs such as the yearly twelve-hour requirement in
South Carolina, are helpful, but education programs alone will
not cure the incompetence problem.
Another technique for dealing with incompetence is a peer
review system in which lawyers with competence problems may
be counseled and supervised by other practitioners under the
auspices of a duly authorized bar association peer review com-
mittee. A model peer review system was proposed by the highly-
respected ALI-ABA Committee on Continuing Professional Ed-
406. This has certainly been true in South Carolina. See supra notes 276-77 and
accompanying text.
407. See, e.g., Jennings v. Lake, 267 S.C. 677, 680-81, 230 S.E.2d 903, 904-05 (1976);
Smith v. Lewis, 13 Cal. 3d 349, 530 P.2d 589, 118 Cal. Rptr. 621 (1975). See generally
MALLEN & LEVIT, supra note 348, §§ 200-17.
408. See, e.g., ABA TASK FORCE ON PROFESSIONAL COMPETENCE, INTERM REPORT
(1982); SPECIAL COMM. FOR A STUDY OF LEGAL EDUCATION OF THE ABA, LAW SCHOOLS AND
PROFESSIONAL EDUCATION (1980)(often referred to as the Crampton Report); Final Re-
port of the Committee to Consider Standards for Admission to Practice in the Federal
Courts, 83 F.R.D. 215 (1979)(often referred to as the Devitt Committee Report).
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ucation in 1980.409 The disciplinary system could be interfaced
with a peer review system by authorizing the Board of Commis-
sioners on Grievances and Discipline to refer to the peer review
committee grievance cases concerning minor acts of incompe-
tence that do not deserve disciplinary sanctions. 10 The peer re-
view committee would in turn be directed to refer to the Board
serious cases of incompetence that come to it from other
sources. 411 This mutual referral concept is similar to the long
standing cooperation between the Board of Commissioners on
Grievances and Discipline and the South Carolina Bar Resolu-
tion of Fee Disputes Board, which has jurisdiction to resolve fee
disputes that do not concern serious ethical issues under DR 2-
106 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.412 Because of the
409. ALI-ABA CoMMi. ON CONT. PROF. EDUC., A MODEL PEER REVIEW SYSTEM (1980).
The model suggests three types of peer review: a voluntary program in which lawyers
seek assistance from other more experienced lawyers, a disciplinary peer review program
which involves a cooperative effort between a disciplinary board and a peer review com-
mittee, and a law practice peer review program in which a peer review team evaluates
the office procedures of a law firm.
410. The Board already has this authority in cases in which misconduct has been
found. The Supreme Court Rule on Disciplinary Procedure states:
[W]hen misconduct is based wholly or partly upon professional competency in
the practice of law, the hearing panel and/or the Executive Committee shall
recommend such reasonable action as necessary to insure competency in the
practice of law, such as requiring the respondent to undertake additional pro-
fessional training. All such action shall be subject to the direction and supervi-
sion of the Court or its designee.
S.C. Sup. CT. R. Disc. P. § 7 (Supp. 1984). Under the proposal suggested in the text, this
authority to require or recommend competency counseling would be extended to cases
that are dismissed by the Board because they are not serious enough to merit a discipli-
nary sanction. Additionally, the suggestion implies that the supreme court will designate
the peer review committee as the supervisory agent for all competency training and su-
pervision ordered in sanction cases. The Board of Commissioners on Grievances and Dis-
cipline simply does not have time to devise and supervise competency and remedial pro-
grams. Perhaps this is the reason that the Board has apparently never issued a ruling
under the authority in § 7A of the Rule on Disciplinary Procedure.
411. The peer review committee should also have authority to remand cases referred
to it by the Board of Commissioners on Grievances and Discipline when the lawyer re-
fuses to cooperate with the peer review committee or fails to complete the approved
remedial program successfully.
412. The Board of Commissioners on Grievances and Discipline regularly refers mi-
nor fee dispute cases to the Resolution of Fee Disputes Board, which in 1983 handled 65
cases. An internal study of the Fee Disputes Board conducted by the South Carolina Bar
reveals that from 1978, when it began operations, through June 11, 1984, the Disputes
Board had processed 265 cases. Telephone interview with Ann Wilson, South Carolina
Bar Assoc. (Aug. 14, 1984). The fee charged by the lawyer was reduced in 25% of the
cases. Id. The total amount of reductions was $38,844. Id. Another 21% of the cases were
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volume of grievances it receives each year, the Board of Com-
missioners on Grievances and Discipline is likely to be the larg-
est source of cases processed by a peer review committee. There-
fore, a peer review system has the potential to play a very
important role in the overall effort to rehabilitate lawyers with
competency problems.
A number of difficult issues must be resolved before the
peer review concept could be implemented.413 First, acceptable
and objective standards for determining the types of incompe-
tence that should be submitted to the peer review committee
must be developed. For example, cases involving a lawyer who
negligently overlooks a filing deadline on a single occasion
should be distinguished from cases in which a lawyer is unaware
of basic procedural rules or has demonstrated an inability to
present evidence in an effective manner in one or more trials.
Additionally, different types of remedial programs designed to
deal with specific types of incompetence should be devised. An
effective remedial program for counseling a lawyer whose compe-
tence problems are caused by lack of an adequate docket control
system or other poor office management procedures is quite dif-
ferent from the type of program that is required to counsel a
lawyer who has difficulty handling trial work in a competent
manner.
An appropriate organizational framework for the peer re-
view system must also be devised. The Resolution of Fee Dis-
putes Board is perhaps a good model to follow.414 The Fee Dis-
putes Board has an Executive Council which screens and refers
cases to various circuit panels located throughout the state. The
circuit panels are composed of five to fifteen lawyers, depending
on circuit caseloads.
Implementing a peer review system raises other difficult is-
settled prior to a hearing. The remainder of the cases resulted in a finding of no merit
(46%) or no jurisdiction (7%). Id.
413. See generally ALI-ABA COMM. ON CONT. PROF. EDUC., REPORT ON THE HouS-
TON CONFERENCE-ENHANCING THE COMPETENCE OF LAWYERS 219-97 (1981); Committee
on Prof. Resp., The Disposition of Cases of Professional Incompetence in the Grievance
System, 32 REC. A.B. CiTy N.Y. 130 (1977); Martyn, supra note 355, at 723-32; Smith,
Peer Review: Its Time Has Come, 66 A.B.A. J. 451 (1980).
414. The charter and by-laws of the Resolution of Fee Disputes Board were origi-
nally adopted by the South Carolina Bar House of Delegates in January 1978 and
amended on June 3, 1982.
19851
85
Haynsworth: Disciplinary Actions by the South Carolina Supreme Court and the
Published by Scholar Commons,
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
sues. These issues include the confidentiality of disclosures made
by a lawyer to a member of the peer review committee,415 the
admissibility in a malpractice case or disciplinary proceeding of
the fact that the lawyer had been subjected to peer review,416 the
conditions under which peer review would be mandatory as op-
posed to voluntary, and the relation of the peer review program
to the Silent Partner Program which the South Carolina Bar re-
cently implemented.41 7 Despite these problems, a peer review
system has great potential and deserves careful study in South
Carolina and other states.418
F. Expunction of Records
The Supreme Court Rule on Disciplinary Procedure does
not contain a provision for expunging files on dismissed griev-
ances. Unquestionably, files concerning cases in which some kind
of sanction was imposed should be maintained. There is also a
persuasive argument for keeping dismissed files for a reasonable
period of time on the grounds that such retention will enable the
Board of Commissioners on Grievances and Discipline to more
easily detect lawyers who have multiple grievances filed against
them. While the grievances may justifiably be dismissed individ-
ually as nonmeritorious, a series of grievances against the same
lawyer over a short time span may be indicative of more serious
underlying ethical problems which merit an investigation. Most
of these multiple grievance cases are likely to occur over a two or
three year time span. Therefore, there is no need to keep dismis-
415. See, e.g., ALI-ABA CoMM. ON CONT. PROF. EDUC., A MODEL PEER REVIEW Sys-
TEM 55 (1980).
416. The ALI-ABA Model Peer Review System recommends that referral to the
peer review committee should be inadmissible in a malpractice suit, but admissible in a
disciplinary action when the lawyer fails to participate in the program or fails to remedy
the problem. See id. at 45-46.
417. A descriptive brochure of the Silent Partner program may be obtained from the
South Carolina Bar, P.O. Box 11039, Columbia, South Carolina 29211. It is strictly a
voluntary program under which a lawyer seeks assistance from a list of silent partners
maintained by the South Carolina Bar Lawyer Referral Service. The lawyer requesting
the referral does not have to identify himself to the Lawyer Referral System, which
maintains records only on the number of referrals requested.
418. Perhaps the South Carolina Supreme Court Commission on Continuing Lawyer
Competency could be assigned the task of conducting a study and making recommenda-
tions on this concept.
394 [Vol. 36
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sed files beyond that period.419
Unless an expunction rule exists, lawyers may fear that
there is a permanent blemish on their official record even though
a grievance has been dismissed. Attorneys may also feel that im-
proper inferences may be drawn by the Board of Commissioners
on Grievances and Discipline from old dismissal files when an
unconnected grievance is filed several years later. This fear may
in turn inhibit lawyers and judges from referring to the Board
evidence of misconduct they have observed unless the miscon-
duct is blatantly unethical.420
G. Addition of Lay Members to the Board of Commissioners
on Grievances and Discipline
While some lawyers may consider this suggestion a radical
departure from the traditional framework of self-regulation, at
least thirty-two states, including North Carolina and Georgia,
now have nonlawyers serving on their disciplinary boards.421 The
ABA Standards for Lawyer Discipline and Disability Proceed-
ings recommend that each hearing panel have one lay person
and two lawyers.422 Under this proposal, lawyers will always con-
stitute the majority of the panels. Additionally, the panel's rec-
ommendations, like those of the Executive Committee, are
merely advisory to the supreme court. Thus, as a practical mat-
ter, the impact of lay members on the Board of Commissioners
on Grievances and Discipline is primarily symbolic.
423
The real value of adding lay members is increased public
confidence in the disciplinary system and the enhanced public
419. ABA JOINT "CoMMITTEE ON PROFESSIONAL DISCIPLINE, STANDARDS FOR LAWYER
DISCIPLINE AND DISABILITY PROCEEDINGS § 3.12.1 (1979) recommends a three year self-
executing expunction rule.
420. The South Carolina Supreme Court recently authorized the Board of Commis-
sioners on Grievances and Discipline to purge all pre-1980 dismissal files. This fact has
not as yet been publicized. In any case, the inclusion of a specific expunction provision in
the Rule on Disciplinary Procedure is probably necessary to reassure lawyers that im-
proper use of old files is not taking place.
421. See Gray & Harrison, supra note 98, at 544-46. According to a 1975 survey,
only nine states authorized lay members at that time. 1 ABA B. LEADER 9 (1975).
422. See ABA JOINT CoMMITTEE ON PROFESSIONAL DISCIPLINE, STANDARDS FOR LAW-
YER DISCIPLINE AND DISABILITY PROCEEDINGS §§ 3.4, 3.6 (1979).
423. See generally Lobe, Confessions of a Nonlawyer on a Disciplinary Board, 1
ABA B. LEADER 9 (1975).
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image of the bar. 24 A collateral benefit of the addition is the
ability to reduce the number of formal hearings for each lawyer-
member of the Board. The increasing number of investigations
and hearings in the past few years has substantially increased
the time commitments required by Board members. The use of
associate commissioners 425 will alleviate some of the pressure of
investigative duties, but will have no impact on the backlog of
hearings because associate commissioners have no hearing
authority.
H. Increased Publicity Concerning the Board of
Commissioners on Grievances and Discipline's Activities
Lawyers specifically and the public generally need addi-
tional information about the disciplinary system.426 Publication
of the names and the basic facts about lawyers who have been
temporarily suspended or publicly disciplined in The Transcript
and in newspapers in areas where the respondent maintained an
office is useful but insufficient.427
The Board's annual report each year is supposed to be pub-
lished in The Transcript. Apparently, however, the report is not
circulated to the media. The annual report contains basic statis-
tical data about the Board's activities and a brief summary of
the facts in all public sanction and private reprimand cases. Ad-
ditional useful information could easily be included in these an-
nual reports. For example, an analysis of dismissed cases would
give lawyers a better idea of the types of conduct generating cli-
ent complaints.428 If this information were disseminated to the
media, the public would be provided with information concern-
ing the types of conduct that will not result in sanctions. Conse-
424. See generally Wolfram, Barriers to Effective Public Participation in Regula-
tion of the Legal Profession, 62 MINN. L. REv. 619 (1978); Shallenberger, Nonlawyers
Welcome on the California Bar Board, 64 A.B.A. J. 800 (1978).
425. See S.C. Sup. CT. R. Disc. P. § 9E (Supp. 1984).
426. Empirical research in the mid 1970's indicated that lack of knowledge about
the disciplinary system was widespread. See Steele & Nimmer, supra note 2, at 956-64.
See also CLARK CoMMroITTEE REPORT, supra note 1, at 143-46.
427. The information provided the public discloses only the name of the lawyer and
the discipline imposed by the supreme court. There is no information on how to file a
grievance included in these releases, which are primarily designed to alert the disciplined
or suspended lawyer's clients. Thus, they are not really useful to the public at large.
428. See Gray & Harrison, supra note 98, at 553-57 (1982).
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quently, such dissemination could ultimately reduce the number
of frivolous grievances filed.
Categorizing offenses and types of practice may reveal pat-
terns of misconduct which warrant a special warning to lawyers
by the Board. The Board could include these warnings in its an-
nual report or in special articles published in The Transcript.
One such notice was published in the May 1984 issue of The
Transcript. The Board reported that it had received a number
of grievances concerning lawyers who, without proper authority,
signed clients' names to legal documents, as well as several com-
plaints concerning alleged unauthorized payments to doctors out
of settlement proceeds.429 Similar articles in the future would be
helpful.430
The publication of additional statistics would also be use-
ful.4 31 Information comparing grievance cases from South Caro-
lina with those from other states would be particularly interest-
ing. This information is readily available from the ABA National
Discipline Data Bank.3 2 Generating and distributing this addi-
tional information will take considerable staff time, but it will
enhance the educational and deterrent effects of the disciplinary
system as well as increase public awareness of, and confidence
in, the bar and the judicial system.33
429. See The Transcript, May, 1984, at 8.
430. The Board published a similar warning article on advertising and solicitation
on the first page of the Janaury 1977 issue of The Transcript. An open letter reminding
lawyers of the absolute duty to return all documents and property that belong to a client
following a dismissal was also published in the October 1984 issue of The Transcript.
Finally, some material on the most frequent types of grievances filed against lawyers was
included in a 1978 article on changes in the Rule on Disciplinary Procedure. See Young-
blood, Revised Rule on Disciplinary Procedure, The Transcript, May, 1978, at 2, 5.
431. California, Illinois, Michigan, New York and many other states publish quite
detailed annual statistics on the operation of their grievance systems. In 1980, the Na-
tional Organization of Bar Counsel developed a Model Form for Universal Statistical
Reporting of Disciplinary Activities that could provide the basis for generating a signifi-
cant amount of additional useful statistical information about the Board's activities.
432. The A.B.A. Center for Professional Responsibility, which operates the National
Discipline Data Bank, annually publishes composite statistics on the operation of each
state's disciplinary system. Since South Carolina participates in the National Discipline
Data Bank, the Board could use the Data Bank report forms to generate additional sta-
tistical information to include in its annual reports. The Model Form developed by the
National Organization of Bar Counsel is in many respects superior to the National Disci-
pline Data Bank report form. See supra note 431. The Data Bank report form, for exam-
ple, does not include information on private reprimands or admonitions.
433. The Supreme Court Rule on Disciplinary Procedure requires that, except for
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L Implementation of Proposed Rules on Attorney Trust
Accounts
On August 16, 1983, the South Carolina Supreme Court is-
sued proposed detailed regulations governing trust accounts and
trust property held by law firms.34 The proposed rules author-
ized the Board of Commissioners on Grievances and Discipline
to order random examinations of lawyers' trust account books
and records and to conduct preliminary investigations of trust
account books and records when it receives information that a
lawyer is not in compliance with the rules. If the examination
reveals problems that warrant further investigation, the Board
could petition the supreme court for an order appointing an ac-
countant to conduct an audit at the firm's expense. The court
proposed corresponding changes in the Supreme Court Rule on
Disciplinary Procedure to deal with violations of the Rules on
Trust Accounts. 5 On December 16, 1983, however, the supreme
court issued an order stating that the Rules on Trust Accounts
would not become effective until further order of the court.
4 6
orders involving public sanctions and temporary suspensions and cases in which the re-
spondent has waived confidentiality, all information concerning a grievance must be kept
completely confidential. See S.C. Sup. CT. R. Disc. P. § 20 (Supp. 1984). The ABA Stan-
dards differ in two respects: (1) Except for the deliberations of the hearing committee,
Board, or court, hearings are open to the public unless restricted by a protective order
issued to preserve the confidentiality of particular evidence or witnesses; and (2) the
pendancy, subject matter, and status of an investigation may be disclosed if "the pro-
ceeding is based upon allegations that have become generally known to the public" Id. §
8.24(c). See Gray & Harrison, supra note 98, at 546-50. Although the open hearing policy
is based essentially on a public confidence argument, see S.C. SuP. CT. R. Disc. P. § 8.25
commentary (Supp. 1984), there are equally persuasive countervailing public policy rea-
sons for a closed hearing policy. A rule allowing a limited disclosure that an investigation
is pending in a case of widely-known alleged misconduct, however, can help avoid the
public relations problem that exists when the press inquires about a particular case.
Under the existing rule, the Board must issue a statement stating that it cannot disclose
whether or not an investigation is pending. A more readily acceptable approach would
permit the issuance of a statement confirming or denying that the investigation is pend-
ing and pointing out that confidentiality is required unless and until the supreme court
issues a sanction order.
434. The order was attached to Issue No. 23 of the Davis Advance Sheets, Aug. 20,
1983.
435. Id.
436. S.C. SuP. CT. ORDER, Dec. 16, 1983. Although the court has not yet issued a
further order, a per curiam opinion concerning trust fund violations issued in January
1984 states: "This case emphasizes the need for a rule governing the handling of trust
accounts in this state." In re Moore, 280 S.C. 178, 183, 312 S.E.2d 1, 3 (1984).
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DISCIPLINARY ACTIONS
The supreme court did not explain its action.
The extraordinary number of disciplinary cases involving
trust account violations in South Carolina 37 is a clear indication
of the need for these proposed rules. At least twelve other states
have authorized similar audit and verification requirements in
recent years.4 38 The justification for these procedures is twofold:
(1) The rules would promote lawyer competence by requiring ef-
fective record keeping procedures 439 and (2) the investigative
and audit powers would provide a way to detect trust account
violations before clients are seriously hurt and restitution be-
comes impossible.
The random audit power is crucial to the success of the
plan. Many serious trust account violations are hard to detect.
Not all clients who fail to receive the appropriate share of settle-
ment proceeds file a grievance with the Board of Commissioners
on Grievances and Discipline; therefore, many investigations
which could detect misappropriations are never commenced.
The ability to initiate investigations, rather than waiting for the
filing of grievances, is a preferable and more effective enforce-
ment mechanism. 440 Moreover, the in terrorem effect of a possi-
ble random audit will certainly sensitize practitioners to the im-
437. See Tables 3 and 17. See also supra notes 296-312 and accompanying text.
438. See Gray & Harrison, supra note 98, at 568. Delaware, Maryland, Virginia,
North Carolina, and Florida are included in the list. Id. at 568 n.130. The Delaware trust
account rules, which in many respects are more stringent than the proposed South Caro-
lina Rules, are analyzed in Carpenter, The Negligent Embezzler: Delware's Solution, 61
A.B.A. J. 338 (1975).
439. The proposed South Carolina Supreme Court Rules on Trust Accounts specify
the books and records that must be kept and provide concrete guidelines for various
issues that have caused difficulties. The rules, for example, specify how retainer fees and
settlement checks are to be handled. In this respect, the proposed rules are superior to
those adopted in some other states.
440. Another suggestion for uncovering lawyer misconduct which might otherwise
escape detection by a disciplinary board is to monitor malpractice cases. See Committee
on Prof. Resp., supra note 413, at 135-36 (clerk of court should be required to file notice
of all malpractice claims with the disciplinary board). Statistically, less than 30% of all
malpractice claims result in a lawsuit, and payment is made prior to filing a complaint in
approximately 20% of the cases. See Gates, supra note 349, at 81, Figure 10. Thus, for
this system to be fully effective as a detection device, malpractice insurers would have to
report claims they process to the disciplinary board in the state where the insured is
admitted to practice. Additionally, the disciplinary committee would have to screen non-
payment cases in order to detect those cases that concerned ethical misconduct but
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portance of keeping their trust accounts in conformity with the
court's requirements. Finally, by providing a concrete form of
accountability, a random audit procedure would enhance the
credibility of South Carolina's disciplinary process.
J. Supreme Court Opinions
On the whole, the disciplinary opinions issued by the South
Carolina Supreme Court are reasonably thorough and instruc-
tive. The court has consistently taken a hard-line approach to
certain types of misconduct, such as neglect and improper han-
dling of trust accounts.441 By now, the court's message is clear
that such conduct will not be tolerated.
The court has also, on numerous occasions, included state-
ments in its opinions designed to warn lawyers of potential wide-
spread problems.442 On some occasions, however, the court has
failed to provide a detailed statement of facts or has failed to
distinguish prior cases in which a different sanction had been
imposed for similar conduct.443 The court has, on occasion, failed
to discuss an ethical issue that the facts presented.444 Although
these are minor criticisms, they are mentioned because pub-
lished opinions are the principal vehicle by which the court ex-
presses to the bar its views on lawyer behavior. If published
opinions are to completely fulfill their deterrent purpose, they
must be as thorough as the circumstances warrant. Perhaps the
inclusion of additional excerpts from the panel hearing reports
would be helpful, particularly in cases in which the facts are
novel or complex, or in which the nature of the misconduct is
not obvious. 445 Facts and conclusions may appear clear to the
court because it has the entire case file before it when the case is
being decided. This is not always true for a lawyer reading a
short published opinion. Brief opinions may confuse rather than
441. See supra notes 275-283, 296-312 and accompanying text.
442. See, e.g., In re Delgado, 279 S.C. 293, 306 S.E.2d 591 (1983) (contacts with
jurors); In re Treacy, 277 S.C. 514, 290 S.E.2d 240 (1982) (failure to cooperate with the
Board of Commissioners on Grievances and Discipline).
443. Compare, e.g., In re Lake, 269 S.C. 170, 236 S.E.2d 812 (1977) with In re Drose,
275 S.C. 414, 272 S.E.2d 173 (1980). See also supra notes 226-28 and accompanying text
for a discussion of cases concerning failure to file income tax returns.
444. See In re Boensch, 277 S.C. 148, 283 S.E.2d 442 (1981) (50% referral fee).
445. For a recent opinion where the Court used this technique advantageously, see
In re Moore, 280 S.C. 178, 312 S.E.2d 1 (1984).
400 [Vol. 36
92




Another potentially useful device, adopted by many other
states, is the practice of issuing prospective sanction opinions in
cases in which the supreme court concludes that more stringent
sanctions for a particular form of misconduct should be im-
posed.446 The court used this technique in 1982 when it pub-
lished a private reprimand opinion concerning contacts with
families of jurors.44 The lawyers' names were not mentioned in
the caption of the case. This type of opinion enables the court to
provide an appropriate advance warning without being subject
to criticism for punishing a particular lawyer for behavior that,
before the opinion was published, was not considered serious
enough to warrant a severe sanction. A prospective sanction
opinion can also be useful as a fair way to deal with conduct
which is not specifically proscribed by the disciplinary rules,
which does not cause a client to suffer damage or other injury,
and upon which the existing authority on the proper behavior is
unclear or nonexistent.4
V. CONCLUSION
The message delivered by the South Carolina Supreme
Court during the past fifteen years is unmistakably clear: law-
yers who fail to comply with the disciplinary rules in the Code of
Professional Responsibility do so at their peril. Now that the su-
preme court has established the ground rules, perhaps it is time
to place a greater emphasis on rehabilitation of lawyers and to
explore methods of resolving grievances that do not warrant dis-
ciplinary sanctions. Additionally, procedures should be devel-
oped to make the disciplinary system better understood by the
bar and by the public. Publishing additional information about
the activities of the Board of Commissioners on Grievances and
Discipline will be an important first step in achieving this goal.
446. See, e.g., In re Bunker, 279 Minn. 47, 199 N.W.2d 628 (1972).
447. In re Two Anonymous Members of the South Carolina Bar, 278 S.C. 477, 298
S.E.2d 450 (1982).
448. See In re Goodwin, 275 S.C. 274, 305 S.E.2d 578 (1983)(contempt citation up-
held but no sanction imposed for lawyers' conduct after discovering that their client in-
tended to commit perjury).
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